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INTRODUCTION 
THE FOUR PAPERS which constitute this volume 
were delivered as lectures at the Conference on the Hu-
manities held as a part of the Centennial Program at the 
University of Kentucky on October 22-23, 1965. Some of 
them have been slightly revised since their delivery. The 
conference was one among several set up by the Centennial 
Committee to consider scholarly and scientific subjects or 
to discuss the place of each of the several broad divisions 
of learning in the academic order of life. The special 
purpose of this Conference on the Humanities was to 
examine afresh the qualities peculiar to the studies gen-
erally called the humanities in the belief that such re-
examination would serve to stimulate a proper interest 
in them and their values. The title of the conference 
was "The Humanities and the Quest for Truth." 
Its chairman in charge of arrangements was Dr. W. S. 
Ward, Professor of English. The lecturers were Professor 
Monroe C. Beardsley, Chairman of the Department of 
Philosophy at Swarthmore College, Professor Northrop 
Frye, Principal of Victoria College, University of Toronto, 
Professor Frank Kermode, Professor of English, University 
of Bristol (England), and Mr. Barry Bingham, Editor and 
Publisher of the Louisville Courier-journal. Three gen-
eral sessions and a dinner were held. At each of the general 
sessions one of the academic participants presented a lec-
ture and the others commented upon it. Mr. Bingham 
gave the dinner speech. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The question proposed for the conference to consider 
and, hopefully, to answer was what distinctive contribu-
tion do the humanities make to an understanding of 
reality? Or, as Professor Frye put it a little less formidably, 
"What do the humanities provide for human culture that 
the sciences do not provide?" However expressed, the 
question is still one to intimidate all but the dauntless. 
Yet the speakers on this occasion, without special display 
of boldness but assuming a humanistic modesty in their 
courage, addressed themselves in their various ways to the 
subject. And as one must expect from humanists, their 
ways were different, however alike some of their con-
clusions. 
Beginning with the observation that the question as 
formulated suggested a need for a defense, Professor 
Beardsley warned that the humanities are not now so 
much imperiled by their traditional opposition from the 
scientists as by the uncritical support of friends from all 
learnings and occupations. He pointed out that the social 
or human sciences now dispute the humanities' claim to 
provide the fundamental understanding of human nature; 
and the defense of the humanists, too often a belittling 
of their opponents, leads Professor Beardsley to his attempt 
to isolate that contribution to man's understanding which 
these studies alone offer. He believes that the humanities 
offer no special knowledge of any range of phenomena, 
no special normative knowledge as separate from empiri-
cal, nor any intuitive knowledge as belonging only to the 
branches of learning called humanities. By his process of 
logical elimination he drops philosophy and history as 
having no unique humanistic contribution, invaluable as 
they are to all learnings, and centers upon literature and 
the arts. Among these he finds that prose fiction most 
readily illustrates the unique contribution. It can enor-
mously increase the ordinary person's ability to acquire 
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knowledge about himself and be so changed in the process 
that he may come to a genuine understanding of himself 
and of other men. It leads to an awareness, a sensitivity-
as do art and music and other literary forms-not otherwise 
come by. 
Professor Frye, in contrast to Professor Beardsley, main-
tains that the question posed was actually a subject for 
study, not a problem having any solution. He points out 
that since Hegel philosophers have unsuccessfully tried to 
set up the basic difference between Natur and Geist. 
Reversing the question as posed, and asking what is the 
unique contribution of the sciences, he states with assur-
ance that the physical sciences provide nature and that 
the peculiar function of these sciences is to objectify 
reality. They are empirical and predictable; and the social 
sciences, as statistically grounded, are predictable but less 
empirical. Philosophy and history, more purely verbal 
than the social sciences, nonexperimental, and nonpredic-
tive, nevertheless depend upon the scientific amenities of 
accuracy, objectivity, and the dispassionate handling of 
evidence. And so does literary and artistic criticism. On 
the other hand, the arts themselves do not require these 
scientific methods. The assumption that if the sciences 
are objective, the arts must be subjective is unwarranted: 
the arts are techniques of communication, depending upon 
conventions (accepted repetitions), as do the sciences. 
Yet the arts are distinct: their role is "to express human-
ity's awareness of being itself rather than its perception of 
what is not itself and outside itself." Expression, not 
explanation, and humanity's awareness are not unlike 
Professor Beardsley's individual's awareness. But Professor 
Frye goes further. He would probe this awareness so as 
to discover the great unifying forces lying within the 
selfhood of the race. For him the study of the humanities 
leads to the discovery of the "containing forms, or myths" 
Vll 
INTRODUCTION 
repeated in literature and the other arts from primitive 
times. By these a man comes to realize his involvement in 
mankind and his responsibility for the world he creates 
and lives in. 
Professor Kermode directly opposes Professor Frye-in 
method at least. Without concern for the discovery of the 
underlying generic conceptions, myths and archetypes, he 
would develop a proper sensitivity to the "high vernac-
ular" as necessary to the continuation of a "literary pub-
lic." (The maintenance of such a public is necessary to 
the continuation of a humane culture.) The development 
of this sensitivity calls for the understanding of the 
paradigms of the arts, the "radical patterns of fictions," 
the language of the high vernacular. This "language" 
accomplished, the reader turns directly to a particular 
poem or novel or other form ready to participate in it, to 
re-create the particular piece in terms of the present. He 
has made the work relevant to himself and his generation. 
Thus Dante or Wordsworth or Beethoven or Michelangelo 
survive to nurture the present and the future generations 
-not by our finding out the underlying myths in their 
works. Not the mythic outcroppings of Freud's iceberg 
of the racial unconscious seem primary to Professor 
Kermode, but rather the immediate and direct experience 
based upon a knowledge of the paradigms. He holds that 
the humanist's critical task must be to convince the stu-
dent that "if he learns the language and submits himself 
to the work he will discover its conformity with his own 
mind and the kinds of question he wants to ask." He 
maintains that too much attention to myths and archetypes 
frustrates "the act of personal participation which is the 
distinctive act of a literary public." To study similarities, 
to follow the ways of science in searching out repetitions 
such as make myths, is to lose sight of the unique, the 
particular, and the concrete expressions which furnish the 
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experience and sharpen the sensibilities. And this experi-
ence is the unique contribution of the humanities. 
Even though the speakers approached the question from 
different points of view and with quite different precon-
ceptions, even though their answers were not by any means 
unanimous, their agreements were surprisingly frequent, 
especially for humanists. Even though Professor Frye and 
Kermode disagree about myth and archetype, they agree 
upon the supreme value of the studies which express "the 
nature of human involvement with the human world, 
which is essential to any serious man's attitude to life," 
which enables men to achieve self-awareness and sharpens 
their sensibilities, and which also enables them to maintain 
a continuum within the flux of time. Whatever the special 
knowledge afforded by the humanities, whatever the 
special methods of finding it, it is necessary to the under-
standing of oneself and mankind. The study of the hu-
manities, especially art, music, and literature, does provide 
a unique understanding of reality. It requires an explora-
tion of subjective reality subjectively, as Professor Frye 
indicates, not merely clinically. N osce teipsum is apropos, 
not only by way of the "huge containing conceptions" 
emerging out of the history of the species, but also through 
the direct experience of literature and the arts. The 
affirmation of the distinctive contribution made by these 
studies runs from Professor Beardsley's attempt to regard 
literature (as representative of the humanities) from the 
cognitive point of view to Professor Frye's attempt to 
distinguish between the kinds of studies which objectify 
reality and the kinds which require personal engagement 
to Professor Kermode's insistence upon direct involvement 
and participation in the work as giving a unique knowl-
edge to Mr. Bingham's eloquent call for these studies as 




So it was upon the basis of the rather logical movement 
from Professor Beardsley's posing of the question and his 
direct analysis of it to find "awareness" as unique, to Pro-
fessor Frye's "concern," to Professor Kermode's "partici-
pation," to Mr. Bingham's "use" that I have determined 
the order of these papers. It is a tenuous order, I must 
admit, and one perhaps not readily perceived in their oral 
presentation, but it seems by all odds the most logical. 
Mr. Bingham was not asked in the preparation of his paper 
to answer the question proposed for the symposium, since 
his was to be an afterdinner speech. Yet it fits well into 
the series: if one looks at the whole, one notices that 
we read forward from a logical analysis of the text, the 
question, to the application, the rhetorical applicatio) of 
the conclusion. 
So far I have tried merely to suggest the leading issues 
developed in the papers. To deal with them more par-
ticularly would require a critique, and a critique is not 
the province of an introduction. But perhaps one observa-
tion is not inappropriate. Professor Beardsley suggests 
that the question proposed seemed to call for an apologia) 
and one may wonder why all such symposia seem to 
require a defense of the humanities. Professor Frye sug-
gests that the question be reversed, and one might have 
applauded him had he not immediately and with unsci-
entific assurance answered the question in one word. But 
one will seldom find a scientist who would even ask the 
question whether he qua scientist has a distinctive contri-
bution to make toward an understanding of reality. Such 
would seem altogether heretical. And yet one may very 
well do so. Indeed it would be most scientific to do so. 
Has he anything basic that the humanist did not first 
speculate upon? Does he not really depend upon the logic, 
the concept of the judgment withheld, and the question-
ing of evidence developed first by the humanists? Does he 
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pursue his studies effectively without the imagination 
made sharp through such vicarious experience as the arts 
require? It may be well for the humanists to humble 
themselves, for that is the greatest of virtues; they should 
remember, at the same time, that without their special 
knowledge, even without this special virtue of humility, 
the sciences themselves would wither and die. 
Perhaps one further observation should be made. The 
conference, the papers, and the discussions which followed 
them, were extremely lively. The questions and spirited 
observations following each paper were not confined to 
the Guignol Theatre, where they were held, but have 
survived to be heard in the corridors, offices, and class-
rooms for months afterward. And they will continue to 
be heard. "To enlarge and sensitize," "containing forms 
and myth," and "the high vernacular" are likely to be 
discussed widely and for a long time. They have become 
part of the continuum belonging to the study of the 
humanities, especially at the University of Kentucky. 
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THE HUMANITIES AND 
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 
~ By MONROE C. BEARDSLEY 
~ DoEs THE QUESTION put to this symposium 
suggest that something is required by way of a defense of 
the humanities? This cannot be because they are in 
perilous straits; in some ways, they have not had it so 
good for a long time. They receive unstinted lip service, 
at least, from the most respectable sources; they get enough 
students to keep their teachers occupied; they are held in 
esteem by the professional schools of medicine and engi-
neering, which insist that the undergraduates who come 
their way should have been exposed to humane learning. 
And now we are about to have a National Humanities 
Foundation-signalling that even the architects of the 
Great Society are ready to assign them a role in the whole 
design. 
If there is a "crisis in the humanities," as a recent book 
has argued,! it is not that they are getting a bad press. 
Perhaps the danger is that in this atmosphere of generous 
good will, they will be supported uncritically-that we will 
be content to fall back on old, vague, and confused slogans, 
that in demanding of them what they are not equipped to 
give, we will fail to value them for their real qualities. 
I do not mean to overlook the existence of a serious 
conflict. It was occasioned by the rise of the human 
sciences (by which I mean the social sciences and psy-
chology) to a truly scientific and professional level during 
the first part of this century. For these rivals have arrived 
on the scene to dispute the humanities' traditional claim 
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to provide the most significant and fundamental under-
standing of human nature. 
This challenge has long been in the making; what is 
new about it is that now we are on the verge of being able 
-with the help of work done by philosophers, social 
science methodologists, and critical theorists-to cope with 
it successfully. But that will not be easy. For the 
bitterness of the conflict is even greater than that of its 
nineteenth-century predecessor and parallel. Then the 
natural sciences were fighting for their rightful place 
among the acknowledged and respected academic disci-
plines, and many of the best minds-Mill, Huxley, Arnold 
-reflected on the possibility of conceiving liberal educa-
tion broadly enough to embrace the scientific study of 
nature, physical and biological. When Oxford conferred 
honorary degrees on Faraday and Dalton, in 1832, the 
Professor of Poetry and churchman, John Keble, com-
plained that the University had "truckled sadly to the 
spirit of the age" -as though an interest in the laws of 
chemical combination and electromagnetism were but a 
passing utilitarian fad. Compare the words of another 
poet, W. H. Auden, delivering his Harvard Phi Beta 
Kappa Poem in 1946: 
Thou shalt not answer questionnaires 
Or quizzes upon World-Affairs, 
Nor with compliance 
Take any test. Thou shalt not sit 
With statisticians, nor commit 
A social science.2 
But those who have essayed to elevate the humanities 
by belittling the human sciences have not gone unchal-
lenged. One of the most vigorous replies is still Max 
Eastman's lively chapter on "The Swan-song of Humane 
Letters," in The Literary Mind, where he said that current 
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defenders of the humanities, especially literary criticism, 
were 
fighting for the right of literary men to talk loosely and yet 
be taken seriously in a scientific age .... They are brandishing 
every weapon of idea they can lay hold on-brandishing God 
himself if they can still hang on to Him-in a vain effort to 
defend the prestige of humane letters against the inexorable 
advance of a more disciplined study of man.3 
The greater discipline he referred to was the systematic 
application of scientific method to the understanding of 
human nature. Of course Eastman did not escape stern 
reproof from F. R. Leavis, whose attack (in the very first 
issue of Scrutiny) began: "Mr. Eastman ... presents an 
interesting case. It is of himself that I am thinking."4 
The nineteenth-century conflict between the humanities 
and the natural sciences was primarily a competition for 
prestige and support, and the allegiance of good minds. 
The present conflict, between the humanities and the 
human sciences, is a struggle for an indivisible honor-the 
right to be considered the proper study of man-and it has 
all the rancor of civil strife. Moreover, just as class con-
sciousness played an important role in the nineteenth-
century controversy, so the current one has been much 
exacerbated by right-wing politicians and theorists who 
fear in the systematic pursuit of social science (or at least 
in social scientists themselves) a tendency toward liberal 
and social-welfare politics. 
It is, by the way, a pity that C. P. Snow's much-publi-
cized attempt to revive the older controversy by dividing 
the field of learning into his two antagonistic "cultures" 
simply ignored the existence of the human sciences. At 
one point in his little book he says that some of his friends, 
historians and sociologists, told him that he had left some-
thing out of his intellectual scene, but Snow explains that 
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any attempt to include them would subject his main thesis 
to excessive subtletyl5 
When we ask a question about something, X, we do not 
always have to provide ourselves with a definition of the 
term "X" in order to be sure we understand what we are 
talking about. But any reasonable suspicion that the term 
is obscure imposes an obligation upon us to try to clarify 
it. And no one can deny that there are obscurities in the 
intension of the term "humanities." It would be extremely 
helpful to us, in undertaking this inquiry, if this term had 
ever been adequately defined. 
Now, we are not completely helpless if we can agree on 
the extension of the term. There are three areas of study 
that many people undoubtedly want to include among 
the humanities: philosophy, history, and the study of the 
arts (most especially, the study of literature). Northrop 
Frye has said "that literature is the central division of the 
humanities, flanked on one side by history and on the 
other by philosophy."6 
Given a clear-cut extension for a term, it is often no 
great task to extract a common set of characteristics that 
will serve as necessary conditions for applying that term, 
and it may be only a little harder to select enough neces-
sary conditions to serve as a set of sufficient conditions as 
well-that is, as a set that will mark off that class from all 
other classes. But the task of defining "humanities" has 
not proved so simple. 
In the first place, these subjects are extremely broad 
and various, as a group; and one of them, philosophy, 
comprises a distressing variety of interests-more than any 
one philosopher is likely to subscribe to. Combining 
philosophy, history, and the study of the arts may be a 
convenient way of bunching departments in a small col-
lege, for administrative purposes, but that doesn't insure 
a fundamental rationale. 
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In the second place, when we ask what the humanities 
are to be contrasted with, it is much easier to say what 
the others have that the humanities don't have than it is 
to say what the humanities do have that is missing from 
the rest. For the others are all sciences-including the 
social sciences. What unites the workers in all the fields 
of social inquiry is the effort to explain some aspect or 
segment of human behavior-both mental and physical-
through the application of scientific method (or methods) 
in the broad sense: that is, the procedures of generalizing 
from properly selected data and constructing explanatory 
hypotheses to be tested by the data. I don't want to imply 
that the social psychologist and the sociologist use exactly 
the same methods to answer exactly the same questions, 
but their basic canons of inquiry, their basic methodo-
logical commitments, and their basic ideals of consum-
mated research, are convergent. 
Thus, one could allow the humanities to consist of all 
those reasonably systematic and intensive areas of study 
that are not sciences. This would be a rather unsatisfactory 
definition, to say the least. But perhaps we are trying to 
go too fast. Let us ask our question in this form: what 
contribution to our understanding of reality is made by 
the three studies that, by common consent, belong in the 
extension of the term? But before we try to answer this 
question, it will be wise to pause once more-this time to 
consider with a little care the meaning and scope of the 
question itself. What kind of answer are we after in 
asking it? 
The question before us seems to be an epistemological 
one-that is, a philosophical question about the legitimacy 
of certain claims to knowledge. Now you may wish to 
dispute this interpretation of the question, at once, and 
to say that a "contribution to understanding" is not 
necessarily a "claim to knowledge." I don't think this is 
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true, if it means that understanding is something utterly 
distinct from knowledge. No doubt, as we sometimes say, 
it is possible to know things without understanding them. 
I know, say, that the television set won't work, but I don't 
understand its not working. Here I know one proposition 
("the set won't work") but there is some other proposition 
I do not know (say, "the picture tube has finally given 
up"). It is my lack of knowledge of the second proposition 
that constitutes my failure to understand the situation 
described by the first one. So, I would say, though there 
can be knowledge without understanding, there can be 
no understanding that is not knowledge. When you under-
stand why the set won't work, you know what is prevent-
ing it from working. 
Now, you might say, television sets are one thing, but 
people are different. Understanding the behavior-or mis-
behavior-of the former may be the same as knowing its 
cause; but understanding why someone steals, or dreams, 
or is embarrassed at a tea party, is something else. And I 
agree-in part. When we can explain the stealing or the 
dream or the embarrassment-that is, say what caused it-
we have new knowledge. That's clear. And without this 
knowledge, we could hardly be said to understand. Yet 
understanding, even if it includes knowing, may be more 
than knowing: it may involve entering into the other's 
mind, sharing his feelings to some degree, putting yourself 
in his place so that you have the sense of being on the 
"inside," psychologically speaking-in a way that is rather 
difficult to do in the case of the television set (though the 
metaphorical idiom I used above, designedly, when I said 
"the picture tube has finally given up," embodies a little 
sympathy and empathy, as well as electronics). This par-
ticipation in the other's mental states is sometimes called 
"verste hen." 
The concept of "understanding" is a very deep and rich 
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one, and of course these remarks are far from exhausting 
its meaning. But at the moment I am chiefly concerned 
to make two points. The first is that in so far as the 
humanities can claim to give us understanding of some 
aspect of reality, they must also claim to give us knowledge. 
So I believe I was right in thinking that the question 
before us can be construed as an epistemological one. The 
second is that "giving us understanding" (and hence 
knowledge) need not be exactly the same as "contributing 
to our understanding" -just as giving someone money is 
not the same as contributing to his ability to earn money. 
I concede this distinction gladly, for I think it is in fact 
the key to our problem. But that will appear later. 
Let us, then, take our question as a question about what 
special kind of knowledge is to be gained from the humani-
ties. But what is a kind of knowledge? 
One answer might be that a kind of knowledge is simply 
knowledge of a kind of thing. There are carrots and there 
are radishes; so there is carrot-knowledge and radish-knowl-
edge. These useful disciplines may be somewhat circum-
scribed-they don't require a place in the curriculum-yet 
they are at least quite clearly distinguishable. 
Can we characterize the humanities epistemologically as 
embodying knowledge of a certain range of phenomena? 
In some broad sense, it is often said, the humanities are 
concerned with man, with his acts and works, his thoughts 
and feelings, and their artifacts. But this is not an exclu-
sive interest, for the same can be said for psychology 
and cultural anthropology, and for economics and archae-
ology, which are presumably not humanities, but sciences. 
Nor is it a universal interest among the humanities, for 
some of the important parts of philosophy are not con-
cerned with human beings at all. What about those parts 
of metaphysics that are directed toward reality in general? 
What about inquiries into meaning and truth? Some 
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people might be persuaded that these branches of philoso-
phy should be excluded from the humanities. But I know 
quite a few philosophers who would resist this partition 
of their territory. 
If the humanities are not a particular kind of knowledge 
in the sense of being knowledge of a particular kind of 
thing, we might try moving to a second and deeper level. 
We could say that a kind of knowledge is knowledge of 
certain selected properties of things (where properties 
include qualities and relations). Just as the physicist, 
the chemist, and the physiologist all are concerned with 
human organisms, among other objects, and yet are con-
cerned with different aspects of these organisms-with phys-
ical, chemical, and organic properties-so we might try to 
find some very broad property, or set of properties, that 
are the exclusive domain of the humanities. I can think 
of only one likely candidate for the job of effecting this 
division, and that is the distinction between normative 
and nonnormative truths-or, as it is often (though less 
exactly) put, the distinction between value and fact. 
I think I can assume, for our present purpose, that there 
are both normative and nonnormative truths. I wouldn't 
want to have to try to give an adequate philosophical 
defense of what is called "cognitivism" in ethics and 
aesthetics. According to my view, it is perfectly correct 
to say that we know, for example, that one poem is a better 
poem than another, that one way of distributing goods or 
ills is more fair or just than another way, that we have an 
obligation to act one way rather than another. These are 
normative propositions. And I assume that they can be 
supported by reasons, and even good reasons, so that we 
can, at least sometimes, legitimately claim to know them. 
Thus it might be said that what the humanities give-
not only what they give us, and not what only they give 
us, but what they specialize in, so to speak-is normative 
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knowledge. The subject of the humanities would not be 
special, but the aspect of the subject would be special-we 
would be concerned, for example, not with what a man 
does) but with what he ought to do. 
It is certainly reasonable to grant the importance of 
this distinction, and, up to a point, it is reasonable to 
allocate the two inquiries to different disciplines. For the 
considerations that bear upon the question how, let us say, 
medical care actually is distributed among our citizens are 
different from the considerations that bear upon the ques-
tion how it is best distributed-even if the answers should 
turn out to be the same. I say "up to a point," because I 
do not believe that the two types of inquiry, normative 
and nonnormative, are completely separable, though they 
are distinguishable. We can answer questions about what 
is the case without determining what ought to be the case; 
but I don't see how we could possibly decide the best, or 
right, system of medical care without taking into account 
a great many pieces of nonnormative information. And 
this is one reason why I do not think it is at all feasible 
to say: "Let the sciences, natural and social, take care of 
the facts about the nature of things; and let us tum over 
to the humanities the task of discovering what is good and 
right-what sort of life men ought to live, what ideals of 
being and doing they should frame for themselves, what 
rules and principles most properly guide their interactions 
with one another." I shudder to think what sorts of 
answers to these basic questions would be given if all 
factual knowledge were set aside. 
When we consider, again, the diversity of the subjects 
we call the "humanities," it seems even less plausible to 
say that providing normative knowledge is common to 
them than to say that it is peculiar to them. If historians 
sometimes make judgments about what ought to have 
happened, or what ought to be done, this activity is hardly 
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a major portion of their work-and it is viewed with 
skepticisms by many historians. As for the study of the 
arts, clearly aesthetic judgment is a very significant part of 
it-though by no means the whole of it. Yet a good judge 
of aesthetic value may not be a good judge of any other 
kind. I see nothing inherent in the close study of poems, 
plays, and novels (to say nothing of landscapes and sonatas) 
that qualifies a man to say what is good, or right, or 
worthy of being sought as an end in life. If the humanist 
is alleged to be expert in normative judgment in general, 
I would certainly like to see him produce the warrant of 
his authority. 
So the humanities, taken as a whole, do not seem to be a 
kind of knowledge in the second sense. But there is a 
third, and still deeper, answer to the question: What is a 
kind of knowledge? And this is the most philosophical 
answer of all. 
Take the mystic for example, as one who claims a special 
kind of knowledge. He does not necessarily claim to pos-
sess the only knowledge of God (though he may); for some 
truths about God might be known by logical inference 
from observed facts. Nor does he necessarily claim to 
possess the only knowledge of certain properties of God; 
for it may be that the very properties he claims to know-
say, the unity of God-can be established by other methods. 
But what he does lay exclusive claim to is precisely an 
epistemological method) a way of knowing-which means 
a special source of data and a special manner of extracting 
knowledge from that source. He claims, in short, immedi-
ate, direct intuitive insight into the nature of a supreme 
supernatural being. He is a religious intuitionist. 
On this basic level, a particular kind of knowledge is 
knowledge acquired by a particular epistemological meth-
od. If we consider scientific method, in the broad sense, 
as an epistemological method, then all of the sciences, 
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natural and social alike, are one kind of knowledge: that 
is, empirical knowledge. And any claim to knowledge 
that is not obtained empirically-that is, by making ob-
servations, generalizing from them, constructing and test-
ing explanatory hypotheses-will be a claim to a radically 
different kind of knowledge. Empirical knowledge would 
be one kind, and intuitive knowledge, whatever its object, 
would be another kind. 
The most ambitious epistemological claim that can be 
made for the humanities is that they contribute to our 
understanding by sharing with us the fruits of someone's 
intuitive grasp of some aspect of reality (whether of man 
or nature)-something that we cannot ask from the empir-
ical sciences, but would be lost without. 
The question is whether this claim to a distinctive way 
of knowing is valid. Let us call it the radical epistemo-
logical question. 
When we examine in all philosophical seriousness the 
foundations and ambitions of the three acknowledged 
humanities, we are driven to the conclusion that the radical 
epistemological question must have a very different answer 
for each. They are far too diverse for a single answer to 
serve for all. 
Take philosophy. I think of it as concerned to bring 
into the open, by Socratic questioning, our most funda-
mental beliefs about ourselves and our world, in order to 
examine their credentials, and to insure as far as may be 
that they are rationally justified. In carrying out this 
project, philosophers can be credited with intellectual 
achievements of the first importance. I am tempted to 
say more, but it is evident that if we once opened the 
question: "What distinctive contribution does philosophy 
make to our understanding of reality?" we would be in 
for a long week-end. We would be lucky to get away with 
a dialogue shorter than Plato's Republic. If I could try 
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out an answer on you, it would be, in part, that the knowl-
edge we get from philosophy is more of the "knowing 
how" sort (as when we know how to do a job or to play a 
game skillfully) than of the "knowing that" sort (as when 
we know a particular historical or mathematical fact). My 
reason for saying no more at the moment is this: to get 
to the heart of the question before us, we must set philoso-
phy aside, and split it off from the humanities, for as I 
have roughly described it, it is no more affiliated with the 
humanities than it is with the social or natural sciences. 
The problems that philosophers are concerned about arise 
just as pressingly and pervasively out of the assumptions 
and results of scientific inquiry, whether into man or 
nature, as out of the work of historians and literary critics. 
And many of the problems of philosophy can arise for the 
ordinary man, untutored in any academic subject, who 
reflects upon his ordinary experience. Philosophy is sui 
generis, and belongs to no group of studies. One clue to 
its independent status but universal relevance is that the 
phrase "philosophy of-" can be placed before practically 
any general noun of broad application, and will make 
sense. There is philosophy of music, philosophy of history, 
philosophy of politics and of law, philosophy of physics 
and of biology. And there is philosophy of civil rights, of 
journalism, probably even of golf. 
Something close to this can be said about the phrase 
"history of-," though fer a very different reason. Just as 
every set of beliefs or opinions can be examined philo-
sophically, to get at its rational roots, if any-so every 
human activity has a historical dimension that can, in 
principle, be investigated. So there is history of philosophy 
and of music, of law and of biology, and certainly of golf. 
If we were to ask, with a firm intent to obtain an answer, 
whether history exemplifies a special way of knowing-that 
question, too, could occupy us for some time. In so far as 
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the historian attempts to tell us what happened and why 
(or, if you prefer, how), he certainly promises us empirical 
knowledge of a perfectly familiar sort. Some philosophers 
of history would say that he does more: that in explaining 
particular historical actions he uses a kind of intuitive 
insight that is not used in social science; or that to discover 
the "meaning" of history, in some synoptic pattern like 
that of Spengler or Toynbee, he requires a special episte-
mological method. It would be interesting to discuss these 
issues, too, but without a historian on this panel to correct 
my possibly misguided statements, I am uneasy about 
theorizing. My own view, for what it may be worth, is 
that historians show no evidence of access to a trans-
empirical order of knowledge. And so I wish to set this 
subject aside, too, and turn directly to the study of litera-
ture. Perhaps I have left this subject in an exposed posi-
tion by depriving it of Professor Frye's two flankers, but I 
am interested to see what it can do on its own. 
Now, the propositions that the student of literature 
establishes (and the same can be said, mutatis mutandis, 
for the student of any art) are all, broadly speaking, con-
cerned with certain aesthetic objects. But they may be 
divided into two classes: (1) propositions of literary his-
tory, which are about the causes and consequences of 
literary works, and (2) propositions of literary criticism, 
which are about the internal properties of the works. 
Now, in my view, in so far as the student of literature 
is interested in literary history, or in describing and 
interpreting what he finds, he relies upon plain (though 
by no means simple) empirical methods. His methods are 
not radically distinct from those used to give us any other 
empirical knowledge, though they may (as Robert Lane 
contended a few years ago) fall short in some respects of 
the refinements that have been achieved (he argues) by the 
social sciences.7 But knowledge about literary works 1s 
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empirical knowledge in the same sense as knowledge about 
Central African cultures, the surfaces of the planets, or the 
amazing physiological properties of the fiatworm. 8 
So if we are looking for a unique contribution that the 
study of literature makes to our understanding, not simply 
of literature itself, but of the world outside the literary 
work, only one possibility remains. For criticism has a 
function that goes beyond its immediate concern with 
the literary object: and this is its ancillary function-to 
help us, as readers, to get out of the work itself all that 
it affords. Now, if the writing of literature is not only an 
act of imaginative invention, or aesthetic construction, but 
an act of cognition-if literary works themselves can be 
said to embody knowledge of a special kind-then the 
study of literature takes on a new epistemological signifi-
cance. Though not itself a unique form of knowledge, it 
may serve to liberate the knowledge that is to be found in 
literature, and in this indirect way literary study ( espe-
cially criticism) could make a contribution to our under-
standing. 
A case can be made out for what I call the cognitive 
status of music and the visual arts, and (with help) I have 
outlined and analyzed this case elsewhere.9 But on the 
face of it, an art of words seems a more likely resource, 
when we are in search of knowledge, that the wordless 
arts; and if literature does not provide such knowledge, 
we may feel doubtful about turning to painting and music 
for it. If literature does provide such knowledge, it is most 
likely to be about a certain part of reality, namely man 
himself. For man is what literature is always about, what-
ever else it may touch upon. And since of all forms of 
literature, prose fiction deals most explicitly and fully and 
centrally with human nature-with motives and actions-
let us take that mode of literature as our test. 
Now, it is very often remarked that novels can teach us 
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truths about ourselves and our kind-that, for example, 
E. M. Forster, in A Passage to India) gives us insight into 
the mind of the Moslem Indian, and, more generally, the 
psychological effects of colonialism and racial barriers. 
What, indeed, could be more obvious? Yet if this is a claim 
to a unique intuitive knowledge, the claim is surely false. 
This can be shown as follows. 
If a psychological truth is imparted in A Passage to 
India) it cannot be merely a particular truth about the 
characters of that novel, who are fictional (that is, non-
existent); to reach beyond the world of the work to real 
people, it must be a general truth. It need not be stated 
explicitly anywhere in the novel, though in fact Forster's 
novel contains a number of such generalizations, for ex: 
ample: 
With so emotional a people ... 
[On Dr. Aziz conversing with Professor Godbole, the Hindu] 
the comparatively simple mind of the Mohammedan was 
encountering Ancient Night. 
What they said and what they felt were (except in the case of 
affection) seldom the same. 
Like most Orientals, Aziz overrated hospitality, mistaking it 
for intimacy. 
Truth is not truth in that exacting land unless there go with 
it kindness and more kindness and kindness again. 
Suspicion in the Oriental is a sort of malignant tumour, a 
mental malady, that makes him selfconscious and unfriendly 
suddenly; he trusts and mistrusts at the same time in a way 
the Westerner cannot comprehend.1o 
The truth may be present in the novel only implicitly, as 
something taken for granted in the motivation, but it must 
be grasped by the reader and extrapolated beyond the 
fictional world of the novel. But then this general truth 
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is subject to test by observations of real people; therefore 
it is empirical and provisional; therefore, whatever may 
be the case with the novelist himself, this truth cannot be 
said to be known intuitively by the reader through his act 
of reading. For (the characters being nonexistent) the 
novel gives him no evidence for the generalization. 
This is the short answer to our question whether litera-
ture conveys intuitive knowledge; it is not the long (and 
conclusive) answer that would be provided by a philo-
sophical refutation of the whole intuitionistic theory of 
knowledge. 
But suppose we were to try a lesser claim-though still 
a significant one. Even if one has no right to claim to 
know a psychological truth simply from having derived it 
from a novel, perhaps the novel can give it some ante-
cedent probability, some initial evidence. If that is so, 
it seems to me, then fiction must be of great importance 
to the psychologist, as a source and support of his dis-
coveries. I propose to consider next, therefore, the relation 
between literature and psychology. 
An eminent psychologist, Gordon Allport, has said that 
"Literature and psychology are the two primary approaches 
to the study of human personality, each having distinct 
advantages."11 He seems to imply that they also have equal 
status. An eminent novelist, Thomas Mann, has made a 
stronger claim for literature. He scolds Freud for tediously 
gathering and analyzing his case-histories, when his labors 
could have been lightened by more attention to "pre-
vious intuitive achievements"-including the "premonitory 
flashes of truly Freudian insight" in Nietzsche.12 
Freud himself often expressed admiration and envy of 
imaginative writers, especially novelists, for their capacity 
to grasp truths that the psychologist wins only by slow 
work.13 For example in his analysis of Wilhelm Jensen's 
Gradiva: A Pompeiian Fantasy: 
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Storytellers are valuable allies, and their testimony is to be 
rated high, for they usually know many things between heaven 
and earth that are not yet dreamt of in our philosophy. In 
psychological insights, indeed, they are far ahead of us ordi-
nary people, because they draw from sources that have not 
yet been made accessible to science.14 
This is a strong endorsement, though the reference to "us 
ordinary people" is ironic, since it is not Freud that Jensen 
was "ahead of," but Freud's rival psychologists. Speaking 
again of the "creative writer," Freud adds: 
The portrayal of the psychic life of human beings is actually 
his very special domain; he has always been the precursor of 
science and of scientific psychology.15 
But even if Freud was not in a playful mood when he 
paid this handsome compliment, we may be skeptical. 
What authority, after all, does the "storyteller" have as 
a purveyor of knowledge about human beings? Why is his 
testimony to be given any weight at all? If we are really 
interested in understanding, say, the Moslem Indians 
under British rule, should we not shut the novel and turn 
to the man who is equipped to give us (or at least get us) 
an answer-namely, the social psychologist? 
Of course, once he has made his study and shown how 
both the British rulers and their Indian subjects were 
hurt, in different ways, then the skillful novelist can bor-
row his conclusions and invent a fable to illustrate them. 
This kind of thing has certainly been done by a sizable 
number of our contemporary novelists, but if it is a con-
tribution at all (and sometimes it is), it is not a contribu-
tion to the acquisition of knowledge but to its popular 
diffusion. The work turns out to be either fictionalized 
case history or psychological science fiction. It is not by 
such means that literary psychology can deserve to be 
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placed on the same level as scientific psychology-much less 
on a higher one. 
Even if the characters and events in a novel were not 
invented to illustrate psychological principles, they may 
happen to serve as examples of them. Once he has estab-
lished a certain generalization about human behavior-
say Freud's theory about the causation of neurosis-the 
psychologist may find a fictional case that turns out to be 
a better example than any of his real ones. Just because 
it is made up, it may exhibit the development of a par-
ticular neurosis in a purer form; it may have all the char-
acteristic features-some of which are lacking in most 
actual cases-and fewer incidental irrelevancies. And for 
teaching purposes, it may be ideal: a textbook example. 
Thus Freud, in his paper on "Some Character-Types 
Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work,"16 makes ingenious 
use of Lady Macbeth and of Rebecca, in Ibsen's Rosmer-
sholm, to illustrate the person who is "wrecked by success." 
Each woman turns away from the fruits of her ambition 
just as they become ripe, and Freud is interested in the 
question why they do this. Rebecca's guilt he traces back 
to the domination of the Oedipus complex, treating her, 
as he says, "as if she were a living person and not a creation 
of Ibsen's imagination."17 And his analysis is very illumi-
nating. But it is essential to note here what comes first 
and what second. Freud has already established his theory; 
the story is only an example. If the theory had been based 
solely on the study of fictional characters and their be-
havior, it would, of course, have no scientific value at all, 
for, since all the supporting cases would be nonexistent 
people there would (strictly speaking) be no evidence for 
it. It would be like a theory of evolution based solely on 
the medieval bestiary and early travellers' yarns about 
exotic animals. 
But if a fictional case can serve as illustration of a theory, 
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then it might have been capable of suggesting the theory 
in the first place. To pursue this important line of 
thought, we must look a little more deeply into the nature 
of psychological discovery.18 The essential object of the 
psychologist's inquiry is not a mere particular description, 
however elaborate, nor yet a generalization about groups 
of people, but something else, not so easy to describe. 
The best term I can find for it is "psychological mecha-
nism." Though the connotations of "mechanism" may be 
repellent, let us try to lay them aside. Consider the con-
cept of repression. It is the concept of a certain way the 
mind might work, a form of mental functioning or dynam-
ics, a particular pattern of activity-that is what I mean 
by a "psychological mechanism." 
To discover a psychological mechanism is, in the first 
place, to think of it as a possibility and formulate it clearly; 
and, in the second place, to establish its existence by show-
ing how it helps to explain some segment of actual human 
behavior in at least one case. The psychologist may, of 
course, be interested to know how widespread the mecha-
nism is, and the value of his discovery will depend in part 
upon the range of human behavior it can help to explain. 
Much of the important work done by psychologists will 
consist in applying the concept-in generalizing about it. 
But it is not too much to say that the genius of the great 
psychologist, like Freud, lies especially in his capacity to 
discover new psychological mechanisms. 
Note that I am pressing a sharp distinction here between 
the mechanism itself and generalizations about it. It is 
one thing to conceive of a person as, for example, reacting 
to his own embarrassment by behaving even more embar-
rassingly. You remember Dr. Aziz at Fletcher's well-meant 
tea party in A Passage to India-"all shoddy and odious . 
. . . He did not mean to be impertinent to Mr. Heaslop . 
. . . He did not mean to be greasily confidential to Miss 
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Quested, only to enlist her support; nor to be loud and 
jolly towards Professor Godbole."19 Here is a psychological 
mechanism, which the novel makes us see very clearly in 
action-more clearly than we would see it if we were 
present. It is quite another thing to discover that this 
mechanism frequently occurs, or that Orientals or colonial 
people are more subject to it than others. A psychological 
mechanism can be named by a noun or by a participial 
phrase, "reacting to one's own embarrassment by behaving 
even more embarrassingly." A generalization is expressed 
in a declarative sentence, or clause: "Most people of such-
and-such a sort exhibit this psychological mechanism," or 
"Most behavior of such-and-such a sort can be explained 
by this mechanism." 
It is in this quarter, then, that it seems most promising 
to look for the special psychological value of fiction. It is 
quite possible that some highly original literary works 
have described psychological mechanisms that had not till 
then been noticed by psychologists. The curious fact is 
that, though it is easy to think of might-have-beens, it is 
apparently impossible to discover actual instances. One 
might-have-been is the case of Stavrogin in Dostoyevsky's 
novel The Possessed (or The Devils). In that nightmarish 
section, "At Tihons," which was deleted from the original 
version (1872) after it was in proof, Stavrogin makes his 
"confession" to the monk, and comes to realize that he has 
an unconscious wish for martyrdom. Being driven to 
"self-lacerating" behavior by an unconscious wish for mar-
tyrdom-here is an interesting psychological mechanism. 
If this section of the novel had been published in 1872, a 
pre-Freudian psychiatrist could have read it and wondered 
whether a similar mechanism was not at work in one of 
his own recalcitrant patients. If he had then employed 
the concept successfully in explaining this patient's be-
havior, we could say that Dostoyevsky's novel had contrib-
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uted to psychology by suggesting a possible psychological 
mechanism whose existence was later verified. 
When we search for actual, rather than hypothetical, 
examples of this sort of assistance, we are balked.2° Freud, 
for example, took much pride in the psychological mecha-
nism that he discovered and called the "Oedipus complex," 
and in the letter in which he first referred to it,21 he 
discussed both Oedipus and Hamlet. But he did not claim 
to have gotten the idea from Sophocles or Shakespeare; it 
came up, in fact, during his self-analysis, on which he was 
engaged at the time. It is true that the following month 
he wrote "I can only analyze myself with objectively 
acquired knowledge."22 But this "objective" knowledge 
apparently came from the study of his patients, not from 
literature. 
Since Delusion and Dream is Freud's completest analysis 
of a literary work, and a most remarkably subtle and acute 
one, it might be expected to provide an example, if any 
exists, of psychological mechanisms originally suggested 
to Freud by literature. The quotations I gave earlier 
about the storyteller being a valuable ally, and a "pre-
cursor of science and of scientific psychology," make a 
strong claim, which Freud puts even more specifically. He 
assures us that Jensen's novel embodies Jensen's knowledge 
of the mechanism of repression, and its connection with 
delusions-a mechanism which, as Freud demonstrates so 
brilliantly, the novel perfectly illustrates. Freud's con-
temporary psychologists, he says, 
have still to learn what Jensen knows very well-that there are 
psychic processes which, despite the fact that they are intensive 
and show vigorous activity remain far removed from con-
sciousness.23 
Jensen has grasped and represented the ever-present chief 
characteristic of the morbid psychic processes.24 
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And Freud poses the question: "How had the author 
acquired the same knowledge as the physician, or, at any 
rate, what enabled him to behave as if he possessed it?"25 
It is by no means easy to make clear and consistent sense 
of what Freud says. At one point he argues that since 
the application of his own 
rules of dream-interpretation to Hanold's first dream has suc-
ceeded in making this dream comprehensible to us in its chief 
features and in fitting it into the sequence of the story ... it 
must have been produced by its author with due consideration 
for these rules. 26 
But later he says 
We think that our author needed to know nothing of such 
rules and intentions, so that he may disavow them in good 
faith .... Our author proceeds in another way [than Freud 
himself]; he directs his attention to the unconscious in his own 
psyche, is alive to its possibilities of development and grants 
them artistic expression .... But he does not need to express 
these laws, need not even recognize them clearly; they are, as a 
result of the tolerance of his intellect, contained incarnate in 
his productions.27 
The "laws" and "rules" that Freud refers to are to be 
understood, I think, precisely as what I have been calling 
psychological mechanisms. Freud does not seem to be 
quite sure just how to describe Jensen's cognitive relation 
to these mechanisms. He wants to say that Jensen "knows 
very well''-has "grasped"-something that other psycholo-
gists don't know, but surely this is putting it too strongly. 
We cannot infer that Jensen knows anything about repres-
sion in real people, just because he can make up a fictitious 
character who exhibits it. He has invented a psychological 
mechanism, but he hasn't discovered it, in the full sense, 
because he has not yet employed that concept in explain-
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ing the behavior of any actual person. That task is left 
for Freud himself. And Freud is quite clear in other 
places that a proposed mechanism must be put to empirical 
test, and is not knowledge in the full sense until it has 
been.28 
One can understand Freud's pleasure in being able to 
taunt his skeptical colleagues: Look, you couldn't find the 
truth, as I have, though even an untrained novelist has 
found it. And that accounts for his suggestion that if they 
couldn't discover the mechanism of repression by studying 
their patients, they might have discovered it (or at least 
made its acquaintance) by reading the Pompeiian Fan-
tasy.29 But that, of course, is going too far. For the concept 
was not really formulated by the novelist; its actual work-
ing was not analyzed and defined. All that Jensen really 
did is present the story of a young man whose remarkable 
behavior can be beautifully explained in terms of this 
concept. But if the mechanism of repression is embodied 
in the fictitious character in the same way as it would be 
in an actual neurotic, then the same analytic procedure 
(and psychological genius) will be required to understand 
Hanold as Little Hans.30 It looks, in short, as though 
Freud could not really have found repression in Gradiva 
unless he had already found it elsewhere. 
But that is not the whole story. The refinement and 
elaboration of a complex and powerful new concept, such 
as that of repression, may be a long process, during which 
the concept may be shaped by many influences. At this 
stage of his inquiry, the psychologist must be alert to all 
sorts of possibilities, thinking of ways in which the concept 
can be sharpened, or broadened to various sorts of human 
behavior. And it may well be that Freud's wide and con-
stant reading in literary works, eager as he was to think 
psychologically about the characters he encountered in 
them, played its role in helping him to formulate more 
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clearly and deeply the psychological mechanisms he was 
evolving and testing. For his own purposes, indeed, the 
psychologist may use literature a little roughly, in that he 
is only interested in some aspects of it. But his ruthlessness 
will not hurt it if we know what he is up to. He may 
come up with some weird interpretations, from the literary 
critic's point of view, for some works of fiction will illus-
trate psychological mechanisms best when parts of them 
are ignored or distorted to make them fit. 31 But if the 
reader is misled, it is the critic's job to set him straight. 
If we are guided by a sound critical theory we will bear 
in mind that a "psychological interpretation" of a literary 
work (that is, the use of it to illustrate a concept in sci-
entific psychology) is often a very different thing from 
interpretation in the literary critic's sense-which is simply 
the process of finding out what it actually means. 
It may well be unreasonable to expect prose fiction to 
prove its cognitive worth by serving the professional inter-
ests of the psychologist. The test may be too tough. So 
let us turn, finally, to the ordinary person who feels-and 
testifies-that his understanding is enlarged by reading 
fiction, though the characters are nonexistent and the 
author no psychologist. How, we may ask, does fiction 
contribute to human understanding? 
Here is the answer given by Simon 0. Lesser: 
We read primarily to discover ourself-above all, perhaps, to 
discover what St. Augustine refers to as the dark corners of 
the heart. We want to know what we would be like if cir-
cumstances offered a particular propensity more scope, the 
form our life might take if we were less intimidated by 
prudential considerations, if we were more honest and more 
passionate, or possibly more cunning and predacious, than we 
are in our everyday life. We want to know how we would 




Two different views are suggested here. "What we would 
be like," "how we would actually feel" -these verbs surely 
claim too much. No novel can really give me evidence 
for a prediction about my own behavior. But "the form 
our life might take" refers to possibilities-that, like Lord 
Jim, I can picture myself as being brave and cool in 
desperate emergencies, or that I can picture myself as 
being, like Lord Jim, tempted into jumping at the critical 
moment. It is this second view, presumably, that Mr. 
Lesser is advancing. 
I believe there is some truth in that view though it is 
not the whole, or even the main, truth. There is a sense 
in which many of my own feelings are unknown, or but 
dimly known, to me. And perhaps, as Mr. Lesser has 
pointed out, 33 when we read fiction we are freed from 
certain restraints of ordinary life, and made less self-
conscious; we can examine feelings and ideas more freely 
and frankly, more objectively, when they first appear not 
as our own but as those of a fictitious character. Then, 
having passed through this discipline, we may be able to 
face ourselves, and open, at least a little, those "dark 
corners of the heart." But I do not know how far this 
self-examination really goes, or can be promoted merely 
by reading fiction. I do not see how this could be what 
we read for "primarily," for it seems plain that whatever 
we discover about ourselves with the help of fiction, there 
is much more that we discover about others. 
For one thing, the variety of new and unfamiliar kinds 
of behavior and traits of character that may pass before 
us in a work of fiction, gives us a widened sense of the 
possibilities-the potential range of humanity. This has 
often been said.34 But most important of all, literature is 
an exercise in understanding. Even though psychologists 
may in fact seldom have learned of new psychological 
mechanisms from reading novels, the common reader 
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becomes acquainted for the first time with precisely such 
mechanisms. Literature, by giving us concrete cases of 
understanding (fictitious) behavior, increases enormously 
our repertoire of explanatory concepts, so to speak-the 
concepts of possible mental processes that we carry about 
with us in our daily encounters with one another. We 
acquire greater skill in explaining to ourselves why people 
(including ourselves) do the things they do. 
To write fiction is to put together plausible descriptions 
of human traits and human behavior. The writer himself 
does not always know why some of them seem obscurely 
to go together-why it seems that a person of a certain sort 
would act in a certain way. But it is up to him to create 
psychologically coherent characters, however complex or 
volatile-or at least to convince us that the traits can go 
together, that the actions, however diverse or even op-
posed, could proceed from the same person under different 
pressures and temptations. He shows us what looks like a 
possibility: a psychologically feasible combination of traits 
and actions. But he also shows us possible explanations of 
those actions. This is the important truth tucked away in 
a remark of Freud's (above), where he speaks of the 
author of Gradiva not only as attending to "the uncon-
scious in his own psyche," but more importantly (and 
more correctly, I believe) as being "alive to its possibilities 
of development." 
What we bear away with us from the novel is the 
thought that, for example, embarrassing behavior like that 
of Dr. Aziz can itself be the result of embarrassment; that 
a man can do disgraceful things because unconsciously he 
craves humiliation; that a boy can become a killer because 
through his bringing-up he has come to hate himself. We 
might never have realized these possibilities before. Later, 
when we see someone behaving in a puzzling way that 
reminds us of Dr. Aziz at the tea party, we are open to a 
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new suggestion: "Maybe he's embarrassed." We don't 
know yet that he's embarrassed; we haven't learnt from 
the novel any general rule by which we can leap to this 
conclusion. But we can now entertain the hypothesis. 
And guided by it, we may be led to further observations 
that confirm its truth. In this way, I believe, fiction helps 
to dispel that blindness to what is in one another's hearts 
of which William James wrote, that callousness and nar-
rowness (especially with those from a strange land or of 
another race) that comes from incapacity to imagine 
mental states other than those we are familiar with: 
impulses more generous than our own, hurts we have 
never suffered, terrors that have no parallel in our own 
protected lives. 
Nor, perhaps, does it matter very much if some of the 
psychological mechanisms invented by novelists, or some 
of the combinations of traits and actions they describe, 
are not psychologically possible, and do not occur in real 
life-if, say, Daisy Miller "couldn't possibly have been at 
all," as a friend of Henry James told him.35 Actually, this 
particular doubt seems to have proceeded from rather 
limited experience. But even if it were justified, the novel 
would still do something for us. Thinking that such a 
person might exist, we would go about, so to speak, tuned 
to this frequency as well as others. Our sensitivity, our 
range of imagination in dealing with other people, might 
still be increased. 
Such is my answer to the question that was proposed. 
Or at least to the part of the question that remained after 
I whittled some of it away. I have reached two conclu-
sions: first, that literature (and most especially fiction) 
does contribute to our understanding of human nature, 
not by presenting propositions that are radically distinct 
from scientific propositions in their nature and prove-
nance, but by enlarging our powers; and second, that 
27 
THE HUMANITIES AND REALITY 
therefore, in so far as the "enabling act of criticism," as it 
has been called, helps literature to do its proper work 
better, literary study indirectly makes a contribution to 
our understanding of human nature. 
I do not in any way want to suggest that this is all that 
literature does-or all that makes literary study worth-
while. The question was not: What good are the humani-
ties? Or even: What good is literature? The answer to 
these questions would be another story-and a far longer 
one, of course. Even if literature contributed nothing to 
our understanding of human nature-and I believe that 
some fine literary works have a negligible value from this 
point of view-its existence might still be thoroughly 
justified, and its appearance in the world very welcome. 
As a pattern of actions interwoven and shaped into some-
thing worthy of intense contemplation for the sake of its 
expressiveness and beauty, a literary work can hold up its 
head. Something can be said on its behalf by a reasonable 
aesthetic. But our duty was to set these other considera-
tions aside for the time being, and to regard the literary 
work from one point of view alone: the cognitive point of 
view. And it seems to me clear, whatever else may be said 
or left unsaid, that the capacity of literature to perform 
this function for us-to broaden and refine our ability to 
understand one another-is at least one of its fairly central 
and lasting values. 
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SPECULATION AND CONCERN 
By NORTHROP FRYE 
As I UNDERSTAND it, I am being asked to discuss 
the question: What do the humanities provide for human 
culture that the sciences do not provide? My own field is 
literature, and literature seems to belong to two groups: 
the creative arts, including music and painting, and the 
verbal disciplines, including history and philosophy. Both 
may be regarded as humanities, but we have to distinguish 
them even when we associate them. The question itself 
is, I suppose, legitimate enough: it is, I take it, simply a 
matter of trying to indicate the different functions of 
different things. It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to 
contrast the arts and the sciences without a good deal of 
oversimplifying and making some false or half-true an-
titheses. There may be some value in oversimplifying the 
contrast, if one has to do that to make it at all: a more 
serious difficulty is that nobody is likely to approach such 
a problem with his mind fully made up, his convictions 
firmly held, and his tentative and exploratory notions 
outgrown. In what follows I am thinking aloud, expecting 
the kind of indulgence that is accorded to such improvisa-
tion. 
It will not have escaped your notice that I have so far 
said nothing except "harrumph." But there is something 
to be said for the convention of beginning with an apology, 
or topos of modesty. This kind of question is often called, 
as I have just called it, a "problem," and one expects a 
problem to be solved. A genuine problem is a specific 
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formulation of experience that can be adequately stated 
in other terms: to use a common analogy, it is like a knot 
in a rope that can be untied or retied without affecting 
the identity of the rope. A question like this is only 
metaphorically a problem: it is actually a subject of study, 
and the word solution is not appropriate. All I can do 
with a subject of study is to individualize it, to make a 
suggestion or two about how it looks from the standpoint 
of a literary critic who is living in the midtwentieth 
century. 
As a subject of study, the question can hardly be called 
new: a whole line of philosophers from Hegel onward 
have beaten their brains out over the difference between 
the knowledge of science and the knowledge of what the 
Germans call Geist} and over the methods and techniques 
appropriate to the study of history or sociology as distinct 
from biology or chemistry. It is an appropriate question 
for a centennial celebration, because it was one of the 
liveliest issues being debated when the University of 
Kentucky was founded. The level of debate has not im-
proved notably in tone since then. No contemporary 
treatment of the subject known to me matches the lucidity 
of Walter Bagehot's Physics and Politics} published in 
1867, or the amiable and urbane discussion of Arnold and 
Huxley about the proportioning of humanities and sci-
ences in the curriculum of a liberal education. A few 
years ago we had the Leavis-Snow dispute, where neither 
contribution was in the least amiable or urbane, and 
where it is hard to say which of the two documents was 
the more stupefyingly wrongheaded. Other essays pur-
porting to defend the humanities have all too often a 
querulous and self-righteous air, like that of a strip-tease 
performer who informs a newspaper reporter that while 
all the other girls just take off their clothes, she is an 
authentic artist. And so, after more than a century of 
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giving answers to the question of what is distinctive about 
the humanities, it is still quite possible that the real answer 
is "nothing at all." Freud concludes his Future of an 
Illusion by saying: "Science is not an illusion, but it would 
be an illusion to suppose that we could get anywhere else 
what it cannot give us." He was talking about religion, 
but he may be unconditionally right, beyond the limits of 
his context, and everything nonscientific, except possibly 
the creative arts, may be only prescientific or pseudo-
scientific. And the arts may be an exception only because 
their function may be a purely ornamental or decorative 
one. This conference, after all, deals with "The Humani-
ties and the Quest for Truth," and the arts not only never 
seem to find truth, but do not even appear to be looking 
for it very seriously. 
The best way to approach our question, I think, is to 
begin by reversing it, as Freud's phrasing suggests. What 
does science provide for human culture that the arts and 
the humanities do not provide? The traditional answer, 
and doubtless the right one, is "nature." What I am saying 
here is that science gives us nature, not the understanding 
or conception of nature. That may only be bad grammar, 
but I mean something more than understanding. The 
human mind can operate in different ways, but one very 
obvious way for it to operate is as a subject. That is, it can 
start by saying: Here am I, and I am here. Everything else 
is there. As soon as the mind does this, nature springs 
into being, like Athene from Jove's forehead, and reality 
appears to the mind as objective, as a field. It seems to 
me that it is peculiarly the function of science to objectify 
reality, to present the world in its aspect of being there. 
The world of science is the world of space: as has often 
been noted, science deals with time as a dimension of 
space. The subject itself becomes an object in this process, 
for there is nothing inside the scientist, from the structure 
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of his spine to his infantile complexes, which is not also 
available for scientific study. Everything is there: nothing 
is really here except the consciousness with which he 
studies nature. And this consciousness, or scientific intel-
ligence, is ideally disembodied. The theory of physics, for 
example, has been complicated, in its more rarefied aspects, 
by the fact that the scientist possesses a body, and cannot 
comprehend nature without physical contact. To see the 
world as an objective field of operation is also to quantify 
reality, to make it something measured rather than simply 
seen or heard. Isaiah praises a God "Who hath measured 
the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out 
heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the 
earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales, 
and the hills in a balance." In science man takes over this 
traditional function of God, replacing the divine balance 
by the mathematician's equations. 
Because science deals with reality as objective, there is 
no such thing as subjective science. What this means in 
practice is that science stabilizes the subject. It assumes a 
mind in the situation that we think of as sane or normal, 
ready to accept evidence and follow arguments. Thus 
science assumes a mind to some extent emancipated from 
existence, in the state of freedom or detachment that we 
call clarity. The sense of truth as an ideal, and of the 
pursuit of truth for its own sake as a virtue, go with the 
process of objectifying reality on which science is founded. 
The word truth itself carries with it the sense of a recogni-
tion of what is there. So does the sense of facts as given, 
as irreducible data to be studied in their inherent arrange-
ments instead of being arranged. There may actually be 
no facts of this kind, but it is important to pretend that 
there are, that facts lie around immovably where they have 
been thrown, like rocks carried down by a glacier. As 
Wallace Stevens says: 
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The arrangement contains the desire of 
The artist. But one confides in what has no 
Concealed creator. 
What science stands for in human life, then, is the revolt 
of consciousness against existence, the sense of his own 
uniqueness in nature that man gets by drawing his mind 
back from existence and contemplating it as a separated 
thing. The animal is immersed in existence without 
consciousness; the human being has consciousness, and 
consciousness means being capable, up to a point, of seeing 
existence as external to oneself. Of course to withdraw 
from existence means to stop existing, and some philoso-
phers, notably Sartre, even go so far as to associate con-
sciousness with nothingness or nonbeing. However, it 
seems clear that conscious human beings can externalize 
their world and still go on living. Human existence, then, 
is a complex of which consciousness is one of many func-
tions, and the concentrated consciousness that produces 
science is a stylizing or conventionalizing of human be-
havior. 
I do not wish to suggest that science is founded on a 
narrowly empirical view of the world: that its end is only 
to describe and understand what it sees. The physical 
sciences at least are not simply descriptive, but are based 
on prediction as well: they see their phenomena in time-
or their version of time-as well as space, and their end is 
rather a vision of nature under law. It is not the experi-
ment but the repeatable experiment that is the key to the 
understanding of nature in the physical sciences, and the 
repeatable experiment is what makes prediction possible, 
and gives to science a prophetic quality. Telepathic com-
munication, poltergeists, mediums, have been approached 
experimentally and certain typical phenomena recur, but 
the experiments are not repeatable (except when they are 
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fraudulent), no laws can be established, and so science 
applied to such things never gets off the ground. Where 
the phenomena are unconscious or where the units in-
volved are small and numerous, like atoms, molecules or 
cells, so that there is no practical difference between the 
highly probable and the certain, the language of science 
is primarily mathematical. From the natural sciences we 
move toward the social sciences, where the phenomena are 
relatively large, few, and complicated, like human beings. 
Here prediction on a statistical basis is as important as 
ever, but, except for some aspects of psychology, the re-
peatable experiment is no longer at the centre of the study. 
In proportion as this is true, the subject tends to be 
organized verbally rather than mathematically. We then 
move into what are generally regarded as the humanities. 
History and philosophy are almost purely verbal, non-
experimental, and nonpredictive. But accuracy of state-
ment, objectivity of description and dispassionate weighing 
of evidence, including the accepting of negative evidence, 
are still required. Hence a scientific element is still present 
in them that distinguishes history from legend, philosophy 
from rumination, and, as I think, literary criticism from 
a good many of the activities that go under that name. 
From there we move into the creative arts proper, where 
the requirements even of accurate descriptive statement 
and the basing of conclusions on fair evidence are no 
longer made, or at least not in the same way, and where 
therefore we may feel that we have finally escaped from 
science. But except for the arts, which pose separate 
problems, all scholars, whatever their fields, are bound by 
the same code of honour. All of them have to be as 
scientific as the nature of their subjects will allow them to 
be, or abandon all claim to be taken seriously. 
The philosophers who moved from Kant and Hegel 
towards the establishing of modern historical and soci-
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ological methods were largely preoccupied with the ques-
tion of boundary lines. At what point does Natur turn 
into Geist? Precisely where do the methods that work in 
the physical sciences cease to become effective or appro-
priate? But it is surely possible that there are no boundary 
lines at all, and that this whole way of looking at knowl-
edge as divided into two complementary bodies is wrong. 
The crudest form of this view is the one that I call the 
heart-of-darkness theory. It is a type of argument that 
used to be fashionable in natural theology (perhaps still 
is), and has been transferred to the humanities from there. 
There have been theories among religious apologists that 
religion, like the ghost of Hamlet's father, or the dancing 
fairies of Milton's Nativity Ode, belongs to a dark preserve 
of mystery on which the sun of science has not yet risen. 
Religion, according to this approach, deals with whatever 
seems at the moment to be beyond the capacities of sci-
ence: creation at first, then the origin of life or the human 
soul, then moral values, and so on-it has to keep moving 
fairly fast, like the lunatic in Blake's "Mad Song," to make 
sure of staying in the dark while science pursues it. Even 
yet there is a strong popular belief that if we once get hold 
of something that "science cannot explain," whether it is 
extrasensory perception or the principle of indeterminacy 
or finding underground water with a hazel twig, we have a 
guarantee of free will and immortality and the existence 
of God. 
The basis of such notions, when applied to the arts, is 
the assumption that if science deals rationally, factually, 
impersonally with an external world, the arts can only deal 
with an inner world of emotion, personality, and value. 
This really reduces itself to the assumption that if science 
is objective, the arts must be subjective. But subjective 
art is as impossible a conception as subjective science. 
The arts are techniques of communication: they are fos-
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tered by schools and groups and depend on convention 
quite as much as science does. In fact there seems to be 
nothing that is really subjective except a rebellion against 
the stability of the attitude toward the world on which 
science is based. It is very tiring to keep on being open to 
involuntary sense impressions, to be detached and clear-
headed, to weigh evidence and fit judgments to it, and 
very easy to relapse into an emotional coloring of experi-
ence, such as we get from daydreaming or bad temper or 
private memories and associations. But however important 
and normally human in itself, the individual's emotional 
coloring of his own experience is not what the arts or the 
humanities are primarily concerned with. So whenever 
I read critical theories that begin by saying, in effect, 
"Poetry is whatever mere science isn't," I flake out very 
quickly, because I know that some version of the subjec-
tive fallacy is about to follow. 
The genuine basis of this complementary view of the 
arts and sciences is the distinction, already glanced at and 
most elaborately set out in Bergson, between time as 
externalized by science, where it is really a dimension of 
space, and time in its other form of the continuous aware-
ness of one's own existence. This latter does elude science, 
so here is something that science cannot explain. But 
nothing else can explain it either, so that is not much 
help. All explanation contains some traces of scientific 
method, unless the explanation is really a clouding up of 
the question, like the doctor's explanation in Moliere that 
opium puts people to sleep because it has a dormative 
faculty. But while the direct awareness of being cannot 
be explained, it can, up to a point, be expressed, and this 
expression is the basis of the arts. The role of art, then, 
is primarily to express the complex of human existence, 
humanity's awareness of being itself rather than its percep-
tion of what is not itself and is outside it. This self-
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awareness is neither subjective nor objective, for man in 
himself is both an individual and, no less essentially, a 
member of the society which is partly inside him; and it 
is neither rational nor irrational. It does not quantify 
existence like science: it qualifies it: it tries to express, 
not what is there, but what is here, what is involved in 
consciousness and being themselves. The arts, then, belong 
to the phase of experience that we have learned to call 
existential, to an awareness that cannot be external to 
itself nor have anything external to it. 
The production of art is, of course, a stylizing of be-
havior like the production of science. As far as the actual 
man doing the work is concerned, I doubt whether there 
is any essential psychological difference between the artist 
and the scientist, any "creative" factors present in one 
that are not present in the other. Both have to use the 
entire mind; both have much the same difficulties in 
getting that very complicated machine to work. But when 
we consider the finished product only, it is clear that the 
arts do not stabilize the subject in the same way that 
science does. Emotions, repressed or mythopoeic elements 
in the subconscious, the manipulating of data, the sum-
moning up of controlled hallucinations (as expressed in 
the traditional phrase about poetry, ut pictura poesis), all 
have a function in the creation of art. The stabilized 
subject of science is usually identified with the reason; 
the unstabilized subject is normally called the imagination. 
The individual artist is a representative of human imagi-
nation, just as the individual scientist is a representative 
of human reason. But at no point, qua artist, is he outside 
the human world we call culture or civilization, just as 
the physical scientist, qua physical scientist studying "na-
ture," is never inside it. 
I speak of course of the arts in the plural because there 
is a group of them: music, literature, painting, sculpture, 
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architecture, perhaps others. The dance, for instance, is 
in practice a separate art, though in theory it is difficult 
to see it as anything but a form of musical expression. It 
seems inherently unlikely, at the time of writing, that we 
have yet to develop a new art, despite all the strenuous 
experiment that there has been, some of it in that direc-
tion. Marshall McLuhan says of the new media of com-
munication that "the medium is the message," and that 
the content of each medium is the form of another one. 
This surely means, if I understand it correctly, that each 
medium is a distinctive art. Thus the "message" of 
sculpture is the medium of sculpture, distinct from the 
message which is the medium of painting. But, as McLu-
han also emphasizes, the new media are extensions of the 
human body, of what we already do with our eyes and 
ears and throats and hands. Hence they have given us new 
forms of variations of the arts we now have, and the 
novelty of these forms constitutes a rna jor imaginative 
revolution in our time. But though distinctive arts they 
are not actually new arts: they are new techniques for 
receiving the impression of words and pictures. 
Of these arts, literature is the art of words, and words 
are also the medium for the humanities and much of the 
sciences. This suggests that the arts, besides being arts, 
may also be informing languages for other disciplines. A 
painting or a poem is a construct: you look first of all at 
the associative factors in it, the things that make it hold 
together. But besides having paintings we have pictures 
of things: that is, there are things outside painting that 
we understand pictorially. For centuries philosophers 
expressed themselves in words, taking words for granted, 
forgetting that there is an art of words, not realizing that 
the verbal basis of philosophy constitutes a philosophical 
problem in itself. It seems to have been only in our own 
time that philosophers and logicians have really tried to 
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become aware of the limitations of form (as distinct from 
the mere pitfalls or fallacies) inherent in the use of words. 
Even now their interest seems to be mainly linguistic 
rather than properly literary, and some philosophers are 
so ignorant of the source of their own subject that they 
regularly use "literary" in a pejorative sense. It is obvious 
that words lend themselves very readily to being an 
informing language for a descriptive discipline. Litera-
ture was not, up until the Romantic movement at least, 
regarded as the most impressive thing man does with 
words, the more objectified structures of theology and 
philosophy being regarded as higher in status and coming 
closer to what this conference calls the quest for truth. 
As compared with music, or even painting, there is always 
some reference to the outer world implicit in every use 
of words. Even if in the future we leave painting to the 
chimpanzees and music to chance, I do not see how 
literature can ever lose its kernel of externalizable mean-
ing. And yet the capacity of words for informing other 
disciplines is not unlimited. Compared with mathematics 
at least, words are incurably associative: multiple mean-
ings lurk in them and the structures of grammar twist 
them into nonrepresentational forms. It seems more likely 
that words have a certain radius of descriptive power, and 
that it is important to determine the approximate limits 
of that radius. 
The other arts seem to differ widely in their powers of 
being able to inform other studies. Painting and sculpture, 
like literature, can be employed to represent the external 
world, and, again like literature, their descriptive or 
representational aspect has had more prestige in the past 
than their associative or constructive aspect. We can 
understand what their informing capacity is if we think 
not only of painting but of the pictorial arts, including 
illustrations, sketches, blueprints, diagrams, and models, 
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and not only of sculpture but of the sculptural arts, includ-
ing three-dimensional models. Some modern painters 
and sculptors, such as Miro or Giacometti, indicate the 
inherent relation of their arts with diagram and model 
very clearly. In some areas, such as geometry, the pictorial 
and the mathematical overlap, and of course the role of 
diagram in the sciences, as in the structural formulas of 
chemistry, is of immense importance. The question of 
whether light consists of waves or particles is surely, to 
some extent, a picturing problem. In my Anatomy of 
Criticism I have raised the question of the role of diagram 
in verbal thought as well. But to what extent and in what 
ways the pictorial and sculptural arts inform the humani-
ties and sciences I do not know, nor have I read anybody 
who did know. 
Music, on the other hand, has often been said to be 
the existential art par excellence, the hieratic, self-enclosed 
expression of pure being with no relation to an exter-
nalized order of any kind. Perhaps this is because it is, 
as Mrs. Langer suggests, the art of "virtual time," the 
closest expression of the continuous awareness of being 
which is the core of nonscientific experience. Or perhaps 
it is only because, up to the rise of electronic music, the 
music we know has been founded on a set of conventions 
as arbitrary as chess. On my piano as I write this is a 
sonata of Clementi called "Didone Abbandonata": we are 
supposed to think of the story of Dido while we listen. 
The finale is a rondo beginning with what for Clementi 
is a sharp discord, a minor ninth, and the movement is 
hopefully marked "con disperazione." But it soon col-
lapses into the ordinary rondo structure, and by the time 
we reach the second subject it is clear that poor Dido 
has been abandoned once more. A greater composer would 
have been more tactful or created a more compelling 
musical mood: that is why the mediocre example illus-
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trates more clearly my point, which is that music is not 
an informing art: it sets up a powerful centripetal force 
that resists being drawn into the structure of anything 
outside itself. We do use metaphors from music a good 
deal ("harmony," "overtones," and the like), and the old 
fables about the music of the spheres suggest that music 
may have an unsuspected informing power about it. 
Perhaps the myth of heaven as a place where harp playing 
is a compulsory cultural accomplishment will come true, 
and the theology and metaphysics of the future will be 
understood musically rather than verbally. When I read 
or try to read Heidegger I get the same feeling that I get 
when trying to read Finnegans Wake, of language dis-
solving into a mass of associative puns, and language of 
this kind is surely heading in the direction indicated by 
the squeals and groans of electronic music. 
If words can be used both to construct an art and to 
inform some of the descriptive disciplines, there seems no 
reason why we should not think of mathematics, which 
informs so much of the physical sciences, as an art too. It 
is a self-contained construct like the arts, and I do not 
see how it is possible to frame a definition, or even a 
description, of the arts that would include the five I have 
listed and exclude mathematics. But mathematics is the 
art of numerical or quantitative relationships, and so it 
has a unique capacity for giving order and coherence to 
the sciences, of providing their description and experi-
ments with the repeatable element of law. In contrast to 
the other arts, it stabilizes the subject on the "rational" 
level, as science does, and is so constantly informing the 
physical sciences that it is often regarded as simply a part 
of them. Hence some of the more speculatively-minded 
scientists and philosophers are occasionally surprised to 
discover that nature has a mathematical form. Of course 
it has: they put it there. And because it informs science 
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so readily, mathematics practised as an art in its own right 
is a rare and esoteric achievement, though its tradition can 
be traced from the semioccult use of it associated with the 
name of Pythagoras down to the later work of Einstein. 
The rise of modern science involved a new way of 
looking at the external world which is most lucidly set out 
in Locke, though it had been there at least since Galileo. 
According to this the world has secondary qualities which 
are experienced by sensation, and primary qualities inde-
pendent of such experience, which can only be weighed 
and measured. This distinction has a rough but significant 
analogy to the role of words in rendering the external 
world as compared with the role of mathematics. Mathe-
matics is the language that can render the world of pri-
mary qualities: words never lose their connexion with 
human action and human sensation on which the two 
primary categories of words, verbs and nouns, are based. 
To the extent that an electron, for instance, is given a 
name and made a noun, it becomes a potential object of 
perception, unlikely as it is that it will ever be an actual 
one. The radius of verbal information, then, apparently 
runs between the human body and its environment as 
perceived and experienced by that body. The nonliterary 
function of words is thus, in the broad Kantian sense, 
critical: words can be used to explain the human situation, 
instead of merely expressing it as literature does, but they 
always remain connected with that situation. 
The conception of science, as a systematic understanding 
of nature under law for which the appropriate language is 
mathematics, is of course a relatively recent one. For 
thousands of years before the great scientific explosion of 
the last few centuries, thinkers had been making constructs 
of the outer world, mainly verbal and pictorial. In these 
constructs the associative characteristics of the arts from 
which they were derived are very obvious. Poets find it 
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much easier to live in the Ptolemaic universe than in ours, 
because it is more associative; modern poets turn from 
science to occultism because the latter still features associa-
tive patterns. Very early the two great containing con-
ceptions of the scientific attitude made their appearance: 
"substance," or the objectified world visible and invisible, 
and "soul," the ideally disembodied intelligence which 
contemplates it. These parents then peopled the world 
with various offspring, ideas, essences, universals, atoms, 
and the like. The great difficulty with using words, when 
attempting to deal with primary qualities, is the readiness 
with which words adapt themselves to what we may call, 
altering Whitehead's phrase, pseudoconcreteness. Adam 
named the animals because he could see them, but, as 
Theseus says in Shakespeare, it is just as easy to name airy 
nothings, to bestow nouns on and make verbal objects 
out of things that are not there, or cannot be proved to be 
there. Again, the prestige of the subject-object relation-
ship meant that attempts to express what is genuinely 
existential, the human situation itself, could take the form 
of the metaphorically objective. The conception of a spir-
itual world is a metaphorical verbal object of this kind. 
With the rise of modern science, words have become more 
limited in their range. Metaphysics seemed for a time to 
be taking the form of a verbalized general science, expres-
sing for its age some sense of what scientific activity as a 
whole is doing. It is more at home however with the 
assumptions on which scientific work is based, because 
those assumptions are part of the human context of science, 
and so they can be dealt with critically, which means 
verbally. 
The principle of a metaphorical object is of central 
importance when we try to see what the place of content 
is in the arts. The activity of consciousness, of external-
izing reality, is always part of the whole existential com-
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plex. The aspect of painting that reproduces or "imitates" 
an outer world exists in painting as, so to speak, a meta-
phor of externality. Even music has, in the witty and 
paradoxical form of "programme" music, a metaphorical 
external world of this kind, and literature has it in every-
thing that we call realism. We are constantly using quanti-
tative expressions (e.g., "I love you very much") as meta-
phors for things that are not quantities. Aristotle, who 
approached the arts for a scientific point of view (one of 
his most illuminating comments on art is in the Physics), 
spoke of the arts as imitative of nature. But as soon as we 
examine this conception of imitation, the notion of a 
continuous relation to the external world begins to dis-
solve, and we can see that "nature" exists in art only as 
the content of art, as something that art surrounds and 
contains. So while science deals with the consolidating 
of what is there, the arts deal with the expanding of what 
is here; the circumference of science is the universe, the 
circumference of the arts is human culture. In our time 
the sense of cleavage between the expression of what is here 
and the study of what is there is very sharp. We tend to 
feel that whatever is objective or external belongs only 
to the spatial world of science: every other "there" is a 
metaphor derived from that spatial world, and such meta-
phors no longer carry much conviction. Theology, for 
example, or at least the Protestant versions of it that I am 
more familiar with, is now trying to come to terms with 
the fact that nothing it is talking about is actually "there." 
God is certainly not "there": he has been deprived of all 
scientific function and he has no status in the spatial world 
of science, including the temporal world that can be 
divided and measured. So whatever the present or future 
of theology may be, it cannot be the queen of sciences 
as we now think of science: science deals only with It, 
and can take no part in an I-Thou dialogue. 
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For a long time, of course, it was assumed that the study 
of nature was also the study of a revelation of God, the 
order and coherence of nature being assumed to be the 
result of divine design. This view was contemporary with 
the view that the models of human civilization themselves, 
the city and the garden, were also of divine origin. But 
just as man came finally to believe that he had created 
and was responsible for his own civilization, so he came 
also to believe that the real basis of science was the cor-
respondence of nature and human reason. Whatever is 
there in nature, the mind can find something in verbal 
or mathematical reasoning that will explain, assimilate or 
inform it. "The external world is fitted to the mind," 
as Wordsworth says. So although nature is an externalized 
reality, it is not, for science, an alien one. In fact science, 
as a form of knowledge, could even be thought of as a 
gigantic human narcissism, the reason falling in love with 
its own refiexion in nature. Whenever there have been 
antiscientific trends in human culture, they have usually 
seized on some aspect of this principle, though their target 
has been less science itself than the kind of essential phi-
losophy that preceded it. Existentialism, for example, in-
sists that if we think of the external world as a human 
world, certain elements become primary that are carefully 
kept out of science: the imminence of death, the feeling 
of alienation, the pervading sense of accident and of 
emptiness, and the direct confrontation with something 
arbitrary and absurd. Once we take away from externality 
the rational structure that we have put into it, it becomes 
what Milton calls a universal blank. All science is founded 
on the equation A equals B, where A is the human reason 
and B the rationally comprehensible element in nature. 
The existentialists may be described as the people who 
have discovered that if A equals B, then A minus B equals 
nothing. 
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We notice that existentialists have some difficulty in 
making their philosophy self-sufficient. Most of the best 
of them have incorporated it into a religious attitude, 
and of the atheistic ones, Heidegger went along with the 
Nazis and Sartre has recently collapsed on the bosom of 
the Church Marxist. It looks as though the attitude, along 
with whatever antiscientific bias it may have, belongs in a 
larger context which is normally either religious or revolu-
tionary, or both. That larger context is a view, found in 
very different forms in Blake, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and 
D. H. Lawrence, which might be paraphrased somewhat 
as follows: 
Reality is primarily what we create, not what we con-
template. It is more important to know how to construct 
a human world than to know how to study a nonhuman 
one. Science and philosophy are significant as two of the 
creative things that man does, not as keys to the reality 
of the world out there. There is a world out there, but 
science sees it as a world under law, and no vision under 
law can ever give us the whole truth about anything. 
Science moves with greatest confidence, and makes its most 
startling discoveries, in a mechanical and unconscious 
world. If we remove science from its context and make it 
not a mental construct but an oracle of reality, the logical 
conclusion is that man ought to adjust himself to that 
reality on its terms. Thus moral law imitates natural law, 
and human life takes on the predictable characteristics of 
nature as science reveals it. What begins as reason ends in 
the conditioned reflexes of an insect state, where human 
beings have become cerebral automata. The real world, 
that is, the human world, has constantly to be created, 
and the one model on which we must not create it is that 
of the world out there. The world out there has no human 
values, hence we should think of it primarily not as real 
but as absurd. The existential paradoxes help us to do 
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this, and they thereby reduce the world to the tohu-wa-
bohu, the waste and void chaos of a world which man has 
once again to create. 
In science applied to the human world, that is, in ap-
plied science and technology, we see the mathematical 
shape of science itself, from the pyramids of Egypt and the 
highways and aqueducts of Rome to the chessboard cities 
and cloverleaf intersections of our day. For Blake, and 
in some degree for Lawrence, these mathematical shapes 
in human life are symbols of aggression: human life is at 
its most mathematical and automatic in military opera-
tions, and in Blake the pyramid, and more particularly 
the "Druid" trilithon, the ancestor of the Roman arch, 
are symbols of imperialistic hysteria and malevolence. 
Every advance in technology is likely to cause an immense 
legal complication in life, as the automobile has done, 
and the sheeplike panic-stricken stampeding of modern 
life, of which the totalitarian state is a by-product, is part 
of a technological way of life. Popular fiction has been 
exploiting the figure of the mad scientist for over a 
century, and there really does seem to be such a thing as 
mad science: psychology used to enslave people, nuclear 
physics used to exterminate the human race, microbiology 
suggesting even more lethal methods of trying to improve 
it. However, even in their most antiscientific pronounce-
ments such writers as Blake and Lawrence seldom if ever 
say that science is the direct cause of the sinister will to 
slavery in modern times. They say rather that man has 
lost his nerve about taking charge of his own world, 
through a false theory of knowledge in which he is "idol-
atrous to his own shadow," as Blake says, and that this loss 
of nerve expresses itself as a perversion and parody of sci-
ence. The world out there is real, but if we deify its 
reality, if we make it an object of imitation, it takes on the 
outlines of Satan the accuser, belittling us with its vast 
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size in time and space, contemptuous of our efforts to be 
free of its colossal machinery. 
The contrast I am paraphrasing is more conventionally 
phrased in other writers, and is often put into the form 
of an antithesis between values and facts. But the word 
value still has something prefabricated about it, a sug-
gestion of something immutable laid up in a Platonic 
heaven. It is man's right to create his world that must be 
safeguarded, and every creation is likely to require a 
transvaluation of the past. Besides, values are really for 
the most part still forms of law, and do not get us out of 
our dilemma. The same is true of the moral categories of 
Kierkegaard, the "ethical freedom" of the man who has 
passed beyond speculation. It would be better to use the 
existential terms engagement or concern to express the 
contrast between a reality which is there to begin with 
and the greater reality which, like religious faith or artistic 
creation, does not exist at all to begin with, but is brought 
into being through a certain kind of human act. 
Science is increasingly a communal and corporate activ-
ity. The humanities are more individualized, and the arts 
are intensely so: schools and isms in the arts are a sign of 
youth and immaturity, of an authority not yet established 
in the single artist. When we think of the scientist as 
voyaging through strange seas of thought alone, as Words-
worth did Newton, we are probably thinking of him pri-
marily as a mathematician. We are, in contrast to Com-
munist countries, extremely permissive about a writer's 
loneliness: we allow our writers to retire into what some-
times seem very neurotic fairylands, because they may also 
be areas of the unstabilized imaginative vision. The result 
is that communication in and from the arts is a slow and 
cumbersome business, and that is why we need the dimen-
sion of criticism, the vision of artists as a society engaged 
in a communal enterprise. 
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As soon as we take this critical perspective on literature, 
we see that literature is organized by huge containing con-
ceptions which establish the literary societies and the 
family resemblances among large groups of writers. We 
call these containing forms myths, and it is in these myths 
that the nature of man's concern for his world is most 
clearly expressed. Our own age expresses itself chiefly in 
the ironic myth, and irony marks the ascendance of a tech-
nological society and the tendency of man to imitate the 
natural law outside him. It is in the ironic mode that the 
writer deals with the human situation as though it were 
external to him and as though he were detached from it, 
and in this mode that he sees human behavior as mecha-
nized, frustrated, and absurd. If one were to say to almost 
any serious contemporary writer: "But I don't like the 
characters and situations you present to me," he would 
almost certainly answer: "That's because I'm trying to 
tell the truth as I see it." In our day the writer defends 
himself in language parallel to the language of science and 
other objective disciplines. These myths also inform the 
structures built out of words that exist outside literature, 
that is, in general, the humanities. Existentialism, with its 
conceptions of anguish, nausea, and the like, is an ironic 
philosophy, a fact which accounts for the lack of self-
sufficiency I spoke of before. Irony, in literature, is a 
sophisticated myth, best understood as a frustration or 
parody of the more primitive comic and romantic myths 
in which a quest is successfully accomplished. These 
romantic and comic myths are those that inform Chris-
tianity and the revolutionary myth of Marxism. Earlier in 
this paper I quoted from Freud's Future of an Illusion. 
Religion was a subject Freud had a Freudian block about, 
mainly because he wanted to be a lawgiving Moses in his 
own right, contemplating the back parts of his own God. 
As a literary critic, I am interested in the fact that Freud 
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and Marx are the two most influential thinkers in the 
world today, that both of them developed an encyclopaedic 
programme that they called scientific, and that nine-tenths 
of the science of both turns out to be applied mythology. 
These mythical expressions of concern, in which man 
expresses his own attitude to the culture he has built, are 
subject to a disease of thinking which is best called anxiety, 
in the Freudian and not the existential sense. We often 
find that those who are committed to a religious or 
revolutionary faith have a peculiar difficulty in being 
intellectually honest in their arguments: their commit-
ment wants to twist and manipulate facts, to maintain 
tendentious lines of reasoning, to rationalize or simply 
assert things for which there is no evidence. The record 
of Christianity is full of persecutions in the name of 
absurdities, and Marxism is also an anxiety structure, with 
a sensitive nose for heresies and deviations. The reason 
for this kind of anxiety is, again, a failure of nerve, a 
refusal to accept the fact that man continually creates his 
world anew, a desire to have it fit something outside itself. 
What is outside, in this sense, cannot be in space: it can 
only be in time, a pattern established in the past, or to 
be established in the future, to which all facts and dis-
coveries somehow must be adjusted. 
In the sciences it is possible to carry on one's studies 
with an undeveloped sense of concern. There are scientists 
who irritably brush off the suggestion that what they are 
doing may have momentous consequences for good or 
evil, and that they should be concerned for those conse-
quences. A sense of concern would make such a scientist 
more presentable as a human being: it would also unite 
him to the community he lives in, and work against the 
dehumanizing tendency inherent in all specialization. 
There is no way of overcoming the barriers of specializa-
tion, no way of making a Romance philologist and a solid-
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state physicist intellectually intelligible to each other. But 
they are united by being both citizens of their society, 
and their realization of this makes both Romance philology 
and solid-state physics liberal arts, studies that liberate 
mankind. In science this social concern affects the sci-
entist as man, but not so much qua scientist. But in the 
humanities the great poetic myths are also shaping forms: 
in history, in philosophy, in criticism, a scientific detach-
ment and a humane engagement are fighting each other 
like Jacob and his angel. That is why the humanities are 
difficult to characterize, not only in methodology, but even 
as a distinctive group of studies in themselves. 
To sum up, then: it does not seem to me that the 
really important difference between the humanities and 
the sciences is in the difference in their subject matter. It 
is rather that science exhibits a method and a mental 
attitude, most clearly in the physical sciences, of a stabi-
lized subject and an impartial and detached treatment of 
evidence which is essential to all serious work in all fields. 
The humanities, on the other hand, express in their 
containing forms, or myths, the nature of the human 
involvement with the human world, which is essential to 
any serious man's attitude to life. As long as man lives in 
the world, he will need the perspective and attitude of the 
scientist; but to the extent that he has created the world 
he lives in, feels responsible for it and has a concern for its 
destiny, which is also his own destiny, he will need the 
perspective and attitude of the humanist. 
54 
THE UNIVERSITY AND THE 
LITERARY PUBLIC 
By FRANK KERMODE 
WHEN A UNIVERSITY reaches the age of one 
hundred years it is as wise as it will ever be. It has acquired 
a real knowledge of how knowledge changes. It knows the 
secrets not only of learning, but of unlearning. Its faculty 
has experienced the full taste of mortality and at the same 
time come to understand the nature of its immortality as 
persona ficta. It is conversant with other immortal persons, 
with the perpetuity of the exigent young, who neverthe-
less pass on quadrennially. It is wise, in short, because it 
has acquired over its century an instinctive understanding 
of continuity and change. 
The hundred years of this university have been unusu-
ally copious in the provision of lessons on change. To 
have been born in the year when the Civil War ended; 
to have come in with antiseptics; to have as one's coevals 
not only Drum Taps but War and Peace) is to have a 
congenital association with ends and beginnings, with 
crisis. Did anyone at Lexington consider what it meant 
to open a university at a time when an Oxford don was 
writing a post-Euclidian and pre-Freudian book for chil-
dren? For 1865 is the date of Alice in Wonderland. Did 
some humanist, weltering in the chaos of a newly opened 
Admissions office, console himself with the thought that 
Kentucky had arranged a handsome six-hundredth birth-
day offering to Dante? I hope so; for there is a sense in 
which he would not merely have been cheering himself up 
but speaking the truth. He would have been expressing 
55 
THE HUMANITIES AND REALITY 
the same apprehension of essential continuity that has 
prompted the University, in its unchallengeable wisdom, 
to celebrate its centennial with, among other deliberations 
more likely to change the world, a conference on the 
Humanities, which change only men. 
You will observe that I have gone in for some "centuria! 
mysticism," as Henri Focillon called it; but I can hardly 
be criticized for doing that by an audience whose coming 
together expresses a unanimous approval of the same 
superstition. But of course it is not superstition but simple 
commonsense to assert, by whatever means, the associa-
tion of the university with men and works such as those 
I named. They are great men and great works because 
universities exist; they survive because universities exist. 
If Dante walked in Oxford he walked also in Lexington. 
You will perhaps be remembering Max Beerbohm's draw-
ing which shows the terrifying poet looking reflectively 
down upon a pompous proctor and his bulldogs. But 
though he might have difficulty understanding the admin-
istration, he would have none in seeing that what the 
scholars, senior and junior, were doing or trying to do, 
was essentially and intimately his business. 
I have abandoned Drum Taps and Alice in Wonderland 
in favor of Dante, and I will explain why. There are two 
topics I want, on this occasion, to talk about. One of them 
is our critical duty, broadly conceived, in the humanistic 
faculties. The other, which has logical priority though 
in practice it is inseparable from the first, is the role of 
the university in the perpetuation of a literary public. 
And in discharging this second duty the university is 
obviously doing Dante's work. 
I shall be saying that our critical duty has to do, to a 
great extent, with change; but we have this prior duty in 
respect of a literary public, and that duty is best under-
stood in terms of continuity. Of course the distinction I 
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am making is, for dialectical purposes, deliberately exag-
gerated. Nevertheless, we all know that whereas a human-
istic training tends to develop in us (that is, in the senior 
members of the university) a habit of attention to the 
past, the world, and a more active biology, commit us 
(especially the junior members of the university) to change 
and the future. We also know that from generation to 
generation we change the past; that is why I said uni-
versities learn not only to learn but to unlearn. As the 
generations shorten and grow more mobile, the gap be-
tween them widens; and there has of late been striking 
evidence that senior and junior, within the university, see 
the world as well as the past in different ways. Thus the 
university contains members who verge on abolitionism, 
as Professor Barzun calls it, and others who are traditional-
ist: passeistes and anti-passeistes, if you can stand the terms. 
Now it is useless to argue that the university must be 
one or the other. It cannot be anti-passeiste, simply because 
it is what it is; but it cannot be entirely passeiste either, 
or, like Stevens' general, it will look rigid and a bit absurd. 
Just as it accommodates different generations, it has to 
reconcile their views. It has to ensure that the right 
lessons are learned, and the right lessons unlearned. In 
short, it has to convince its junior members of the use 
of the past and the indispensability of continuity. If it is 
a university at all, it has to work in such a way that it 
will seem natural, on its two-hundredth birthday, and on 
the eight-hundredth birthday of Dante, to hold a humani-
ties conference which will discuss not only the past but the 
crisis of learning; for the one thing we can confidently 
predict is that there will be a crisis of learning. It follows 
from the nature of the world, and from the difference 
between being and knowing. Now if that conference 
occurs it will be a proof that something started by Dante 
is still going on. It will mean that the university has done 
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one of its jobs, its basic humanistic job, which is to per-
petuate the literary public. 
What is a literary public? We should know, for it is 
what we try to produce or maintain in our undergraduate 
schools. And though some of us may feel a twinge of guilt 
at the thought, that is where our most important work 
lies. Historians nowadays sometimes speak of a kind of 
European apocalypse, of a culture "nearing its term"; 
in fact this is the expression of Erich Auerbach, who 
did so much to define what is meant by a literary public. 
Now it seems that the graduate schools might survive 
this sad event. There one speaks a learned language; 
but the business of the undergraduate school is conducted 
in the vernacular. The learning of the Carolingian schools 
was conducted in Latin, and there was no learning outside 
them for lack of an adequate vernacular. The same 
difficulty threatened early Renaissance humanism. The 
creation and maintenance of a literary public requires 
the creation and maintenance of an adequate high ver-
nacular. Dante created it, and our business is to maintain 
it. Of course our graduate students are saved from in-
verted barbarism, as it were, by having been through 
a course of vernacular instruction, and their more ad-
vanced work is to acquire the means by which one 
asks the right questions of the past, and the means by 
which to estimate, for the benefit of the next genera-
tion, the quality of contemporary efforts at finding things 
out by humanistic study. It is important work, but with-
out the vernacular studies of the undergraduate nobody 
could be trained to do it, and there would be nobody to 
do it for. 
The creation of a high vernacular, to which we can give 
the "ideal date" of 1300, established a literary public. And 
this made possible a developing, changing literature of the 
modern sort. The forms of literature, as of art, depend 
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for their effect upon a collaboration between artist and 
public. It is a point made beautifully clear, so far as 
painting is concerned, by E. H. Gombrich. It has not been 
so expressly stated for literature, yet the situation is 
analogous. Without a communications agreement founded 
on this vernacular, this vulgaris nobilior, literature could 
not have invented for itself new conventions, new fields of 
interest. There could not have been that history of 
increasingly sophisticated means, careful archaistic rever-
sions, new forms creating the taste by which they were to 
be enjoyed. There could not even have been the literature 
which rebels against the literary language or the literary 
public, since the nature and extent of the rebellion can 
only be measured if you speak the language or understand 
the assumptions of the public rejected. And that is why I 
say that our first task is simply to teach this language. 
The job is partly a historian's job, but by no means 
entirely so. It is also partly a matter of inducing acceptance 
of much that may seem arbitrary, by whatever means one 
can. More and more, we may find, the young resist the 
proposition that they cannot know any literature, even 
the book that came out today, without learning something 
of the language we teach. Often the complaint of the 
undergraduate is quite justified; he can complain, so to 
speak, that he asks for Dante's vernacular and we give him 
Carolingian Latin. He can say we have forgotten that the 
present is what determines the interest of the past, and 
that he has no wish to belong to the company of, or speak 
the language of, a dead reading public. But we are all so 
timid about the young just now, so afraid to seem to put 
ourselves against them-an aspect of that cultural com-
placency rightly said by Diana Trilling to be just as bad 
as anticultural complacency-that it's necessary here to 
add that the complaint of the undergraduate is also often 
unjustified. He has his rights, but so has the immortal 
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persona ficta, the reading public. Nobody is literary on 
instinct; it has to be learned. 
It may well be that the way to teach the young what 
they need to know in order to join this august body is not 
what it used to be. P. B. Medawar has recently been 
ridiculing what he calls Anglo-Saxon attitudes to scientific 
research. The scientist, we say, is concerned with the 
growth of organized factual knowledge, but the burden 
of facts is becoming insupportable, and so everybody 
retreats into minute specialisation, and communications, 
even between scisntists engaged in different branches of 
one subject, say physics, break down. And much more 
of the same kind of thing. Medawar calls this "false in 
every particular," and declares that the thoughts he has 
been criticising are "not really thoughts at all, but thought-
substitutes, declarations of the kind public people make 
on public occasions when they are desperately hard up 
for something to say." The need to learn facts, in zoology 
for instance, is less than it was a hundred years ago; mod-
ern science has seen the breakdown of specialisms; and 
so on. Everything depends upon the criteria by which 
knowledge is valued. In literature there was a notion that 
the study of modern as apposed to ancient literature 
could provide the discipline formerly associated with 
difficult languages and remote history. So the emphasis 
fell on the learning of facts. We are following the sciences 
out of this phase. As Medawar puts it, the scientist values 
what he is doing by the size of its contribution to a 
logically articulated structure of ideas; the humanist has 
been a nuisance in a way because he has a deep distrust 
of utility, and cannot see, as scientists can, that it is 
compatible with "elegance" and "beauty"; nevertheless 
he must come to value his work by the contribution it 
makes "directly or indirectly, to our understanding of 
human nature and conduct, and human sensibility." 
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I'll return to the comparison with science; meanwhile 
the point is that Medawar is right about the humanities, 
and this being so we must relate our methods of teaching 
the volgare illustre to such aims as he-a little vaguely, 
perhaps, but the point isn't central to his argument-lays 
down. This way of estimating the value of instruction in 
the humanities is acceptable to the student, though he may 
not like some of the disciplines involved; they may strike 
him as having little to do with his world. It is no use 
denying, given the social constitution of a university, that 
this is the primary problem: teaching the lesson of con-
tinuity to intelligent people who are sceptical about its 
relevance. How, in the wisdom of a hundred years, will 
a university deal with it? 
First, by recognising the force of change. The needs of 
the student are different. The past of literature has 
changed; we must be sure that the image we have of it is 
not eidetic, that we have not accepted a receipt to deceive. 
Secondly, and more positively, by establishing a fertile 
relationship between the two broadly conflicting attitudes 
that come together whenever we sit with an undergraduate. 
This we can only do by a sort of symbiotic process, made 
possible by the presence of the book or topic we happen 
to be discussing. The aim, as I see it, must be to enable 
the student to read with what Michael Polanyi calls "tacit 
intelligence." Polanyi's illustration of this attribute is 
from the sciences, naturally enough; but one of the reasons 
why we should value him highly is that he will not allow 
that there is, in respect of the way the mind is used, any 
generic difference between the most authentic activities of 
science and the humanities. "Tacit" intelligence enables 
a doctor to make a diagnosis or a critic to understand a 
poem. It would not be possible to specify the mental acts 
and decisions involved in such acts; they are the effect of 
powers the knower has acquired, and they are essential to 
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any kind of knowing that gives the knower the satisfaction 
of truth or beauty or elegance, or whatever you care to 
call the feeling that one knows, whether what is under-
stood is called a problem in physics or a poem. Polanyi 
argues that this implies in all knowledge an inescapable 
degree of personal participation. 
Scientists are, indeed, much franker about this situation 
than critics. They know how Newton and Einstein and 
Planck can all be relevant, and speak freely of "elegance." 
Of course, I do not propose that in our business of teach-
ing a language and forming a literary public we should 
revert to ejaculatory criticism; by "elegant" a scientist 
means complete, economical, achieved, and usually, by 
some easy implication, useful. Speaking thus of "Resolu-
tion and Independence" for instance, is unlikely to impress 
a sceptical undergraduate, who might well argue that it is, 
as he understands the words, inelegant, clumsy in fact. 
Its text is not, like a theorem or the report of an experi-
ment, self-explanatory. You might reply by suggesting 
that there are reasons, in tradition, in rhetoric, in Words-
worth's earlier poems, for this one having such a shape, 
and making such demands. But this would be an attempt 
to relate it to some systematic description of literature in 
something like the way the new hypothesis of the physicist 
is related to the logical structure of science in general. 
The student might reply, "Ortega was right, it seems, 
about the dehumanisation of art, and the curious thing is 
that it should happen at the very time when the scientists 
were giving up their pretensions to inhumanity." If you 
still want to make of him a man who will tacitly recognise 
that "Resolution and Independence" is a great poem you 
must do more than talk about the history of poetry, or 
the history of ideas, or the occult mythic structure of 
literature; you must bully him into a personal participa-
tion in this piece of knowledge: explain for instance, that 
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the apparent inelegance, translated into the high vernac-
ular, is the ultimate elegance. The turpiloquium of the 
old man is caught up in a cardinal language, a new exten-
sion of the volgare illustre. Now this is hard work, a 
rhetorical performance however small the scale. But when 
you have done it you have the pleasure of knowing that 
something has happened-the encounter of a mind with 
something to be known that changes the mind for good 
-which will never be undone. The poem will never be a 
mere object again. It is almost a union of two persons-
"weak minds on love revealed may look." The mind and 
sensibility so affected has a more effective store of tacit 
knowledge to bring to the next encounter. 
Ideally, when he graduates, this young man will need 
you no more, and may even, unless he teaches himself, 
wonder why you made such a fuss about something so 
obvious. He knows, without working it out explicitly, 
what marvellous feats of counterpointing, what intricacies 
of peripeteia, what intellectual shocks, are concealed in 
"Resolution and Independence." He will bring this knowl-
edge to King Lear, or War and Peace or Drum Taps, 
or to An American Dream and Kaddish. And he will not 
merely participate, he will judge. The knowledge he has 
acquired of the way things mean more or other than they 
say, and that their meanings change by his own interven-
tion, will serve him outside literature; for in such respects 
the literary public is only the acutest point of the whole 
culture, and in every department ours has been and is a 
culture which assumes that things mean more or other 
than they say. If you suggest that the example I gave is 
an instance of brainwashing, I accept the charge; nobody 
with a perfectly open mind ever became a Christian, a 
poet, a philosopher, a historian, or a critic. And it is worth 
noting, as Wallace Stevens liked to point out, that the gods 
of China are always Chinese and that Danes are happiest 
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in Denmark. In short, what you call brainwashing I call 
acquiring a tacit knowledge of the peculiar assumptions 
and conditions of one's own cultural tradition. 
I have now to admit that the undergraduate endowed 
with such knowledge is a rare specimen. What he did 
was to learn from the teacher how to engage a prepared 
mind with a work of art belonging to the order we elect 
to call the highest. It is too cosy a story, as we all know. 
There arise the questions, whether instead of this random 
propaganda and desperate intuition we cannot have a 
more systematic approach to literary study; and whether 
all this doesn't beg the undergraduate's question, since 
it assumes continuity where he assumes schism. I find 
both of these questions to be serious and complicated, 
and instead of trying to answer them directly I shall turn 
to what I announced as the second of the topics I should 
touch on in this talk; what I called non-committally, our 
critical duty. 
First of all, we must take the young man seriously and 
attend, though this means a deviation from the natural 
and easier bent of our attention, to change. Like the giant 
in the poem, the university must live in change, as the high 
vernacular also lives in change: 
... l'uso di mortali e come fronda 
in ramo, che sen va e altra vene. 
(Paradiso xxvi, 137-8) 
"The usage of mortals is like a leaf on a branch, which goes 
and another comes." 
In other words, it does not seem to me to be part of our 
critical duty to argue, with our superior skill, for an 
unchallengeable order of literature upon which the sempi-
ternal literary public must pasture, without in some meas-
ure undertaking to justify that order as relevant to a 
modern sense of reality. King Lear, I am quite certain, 
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is a good play; and I am certain of more, namely that 
anybody who does not know this is unlikely to say much 
of any interest about plays, or poems, or history, or perhaps 
anything. Nevertheless, it is arguable that King Lear is a 
disordered and even ignorant document; that it lacks 
"elegance"; that, like the language of the Romans with 
which straight roads were built, it was good but had to die. 
A good undergraduate might argue thus, or rather argue 
better; he might say that Malone Dies or Howl was for 
him a better instrument with which to find out the 
unknown things about oneself for which King Lear was 
formerly an acceptable instrument of search. For an epoch, 
as Einstein said, is the instruments of its research. How 
do we explain that tacit knowledge which accepts that 
Lear, the instrument of an earlier epoch, still works, and 
that Malone Dies would be reduced to impotence by the 
same stroke that disabled Lear? 
This defense of Lear seems in the long run to require 
that one say as clearly as possible what one conceives 
literary studies to be. Whatever one says must allow for 
changes, not only in what is studied but in the manner 
of study; this is the wisdom of a university. Thus there 
was a time when it was a tenable view that scientific 
history, or scientific classification, was the main or even 
the sole business of criticism. But why should we pretend 
that this remains true? Philosophers of history no longer 
accept the possibility of what used to be called scientific 
history-Ranke's "precisely what happened." Windelband, 
Rickert and Dilthey established what has been called "the 
secession of history from the natural sciences," though 
we need not call it that; Dilthey only said that the Geistes-
wissenschaften differed from the Naturwissenschaften in 
that they could be known from within. Windelband 
believed that history differed from the sciences because it 
dealt with events that were unique, whereas the natural 
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sciences are impossible except in relation to repeating or 
repeatable events. It may be that these distinctions are 
too sharp. If the direction of our interest were different 
we might read in the great achievements of scientific theory 
something equivalent to the confessional element in po-
etry, some experience of the world as unique as a poem, 
and as much the product of what Dilthey calls "living 
through" as a poem. But some distinctions nevertheless 
remain. Planck's constant is valuable, I take it, not because 
it cost him much mental pain and not only because it is 
"elegant" but because it works, even for those who haven't 
in any sense "lived through" it. It assumes repetitiveness 
in the nature of things, though it is indeed a very refined 
repetitiveness, calling for an extraordinary effort of imagi-
nation to formulate it. "Resolution and Independence," 
or King Lear, can be absolutely dead things, painfully 
produced no doubt; or they can, by straining the word, 
be called "elegant"; but they are not experiments you can 
invigilate; they are experiences correlative with the mental 
pains that produced them, experiences in which you par-
ticipate, miming their elegances perhaps, tacitly repeating 
their questions even, but in no acceptable sense of the 
word using them, or, without entering them, checking 
their conformity with the experience of reality. And to 
place them in some flat pseudoscientific historic scale, or 
to classify them according to Linnaean schemes, however 
subtle, is to say nothing of them that is of any use to the 
people they chiefly concern, the literary public. 
Long ago T. S. Eliot, among others, suggested that we 
should think of literature as having "a simultaneous 
existence" and composing a "simultaneous order." There 
is more than one way of regarding this famous proposition. 
Let me suggest two ways. One is Professor Frye's; his 
whole effort is really to make us see that our business is 
to describe this order. There is, I think, time in his 
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universe, but it is not very important; all literature is 
produced by the displacement of certain radical themes 
which, if they are archaic, are also perpetual. The other 
I shall express for the moment by what may seem a 
difficult formula, which I shall explain in a minute. It 
suggests that the proposition is valid, and may be the base 
for valid inference, on the assumption that what it really 
implies is our power, by our tacit knowledge of the volgare 
illustre, to participate in past literature by treating it as 
a special case of our more immediate concerns. We can 
call the first of these Professor Frye's theory, and the second 
simply the special case theory. 
Let me first say a word about Professor Frye's theory. 
It has power and elegance, but it pushes criticism back to 
the position history was in before Windelband's secession. 
If your aim is to assimilate any literary document with 
the ultimate categories of "undisplaced" myth it is obvious 
that your account of the work, however ingenious, is 
calculated to make it appear more like some other work 
which has to be got into the same category than it appeared 
before you began. Thus when you are speaking of Shake-
speare's comedies you move back "from the characteristics 
of the individual play" to the consideration of "what kind 
of a form comedy is," and when you step back far enough 
you see a myth they have in common, as when it is argued 
that Andromeda is behind the heroines of the romances. 
The figure used by Mr. Frye is "stepping back," as you 
step back from a picture to see its formal design; but a 
better figure would be a slow putting out of the lights on 
the theory that all cats are grey in the dark. Mr. Frye 
would probably say that when I emphasise the uniqueness 
of great works of art, their challenge to personal participa-
tion, I am saying nothing particularly offensive or even 
that I am saying something banal; but he would also say 
that it has nothing whatever to do with criticism. This of 
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course is what I deny. I don't, for example, imagine that 
he himself could have written a book so devoted to the 
avoidance of value judgments if he weren't habituated, 
as teachers are, to making them very unobtrusively, as he 
does in Anatomy. Between the Acts, he remarks in a casual 
aside, is Virginia Woolf's profoundest novel. I agree; but 
I claim the critic's right to say so. 
One's protest, in fact, is all of a piece. If literature is 
radically spatial, unrelated to time, and changing only in 
a cycle of modes, it is certainly curious that we have such 
difficulty over critical terminology. We are still not sure 
what we mean when we use Aristotle's, which has been 
current since the beginnings of modern criticism; we are 
constantly in need of new terms to describe, not marginal 
changes or modal variations, but the most fundamental 
qualities of past literature. Time and literature change, 
we change with it. If we omit to consider this simple fact, 
and the related one that it changes at a different rate for 
the young, we substitute, in my earlier figure, Carolingian 
Latin for the lingua franca et jocundissima. Instead of 
the progressive and scientific system we were promised 
we get a monkish game. 
It is possible that the argument I am constructing is too 
old or obvious to interest you much. I am saying that an 
undue attention to types and archetypes frustrates the act 
of personal participation which is the distinctive act of a 
literary public. To put it another way, in an expression 
borrowed from Sartre, who however uses it in philosophi-
cal and political contexts, dependence on eidetic imagery 
is an indication of mauvaise foi. I am not calling Professor 
Frye a salaud, though perhaps I am hinting that his regres-
sive or eidetic theory of literature is a piece of cosmic 
toryism, a high mimetic approach to the topic which time 
and change must invalidate, and which can hardly serve 
the needs of our catechumens, the antibourgeois young. 
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I have been speaking of Mr. Frye, somewhat unfairly, as 
a representative, because he has in another and extremely 
interesting form the obsession with scientific philology 
from which Scrutiny and the New Criticism gave us a 
holiday lasting a quarter of a century. But I am not 
advocating a return either to the antiscience of the Sym-
bolist criticism or to the a-methodical method of the 
Scrutiny critics, who certainly believed in personal par-
ticipation but all too readily substituted a quasi-dogmatic 
apparatus of tradition and a bleak dissociationist soci-
ology; if Frye looks like an angelologist they, at their 
dogmatic worst, sound like double predestinarians. What 
I do suggest is that we can hold a view of our critical duty 
which is consistent with the preservation of a literary 
public in a society more obviously able to cope with the 
intellectual structures of science. In outlining this view 
I shall be explaining what a few moments ago I called the 
special case theory of past literature. 
To do that is not, I think, to set up some impassable 
barrier between science and literature; on the contrary, it 
will be necessary to argue that in their usefulness as ways 
of settling us into the world they are radically similar. 
Certainly science is about reality experienced as repetitive, 
and art about reality experienced as constituted of unique 
events; but that we do experience reality in both these 
ways is a fact about the way our minds work. 
The scientists have become critical of their fictions, even 
though their metaphysic aims at regularity; they under-
stand the readiness of nature to conform, and so interest 
themselves in concords rather than in absolute truth. 
Concords are humanly pleasing and consoling. In literary 
fictions we seek similarly consoling and pleasing concords, 
but as Blackmur once observed, our metaphysic has grown 
irregular. It is so because we also are much more critical 
of the truth-bearing function of fictions than we were; and 
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this is true of historiographic as well as of literary-critical 
fictions; it is also true of novels, our predominant fictional 
form, where, so history tells us, the urge to be free of the 
paradigm is one of the ways in which we estimate greatness. 
It is our consciousness of the difficult status of fictions that 
prevents their achieving the sort of generality that pleases 
many and pleases long; they are quickly obsolescent, and a 
sense of reality as a paradigmatic is very strong in our time 
-especially, as I have been saying, in the young. All who 
teach the arts in universities would do well to remember 
what Matthew Arnold said of the way in which the satisfac-
tion of our needs changes though our needs continue: 
The Middle Age could do without humane letters, as it could 
do without the study of nature, because its supposed knowl-
edge was made to engage the emotions so powerfully. Grant 
that the supposed knowledge disappears, its power of being 
made to engage our emotions will disappear with it,-but the 
emotions themselves, and their claim to be engaged and satis-
fied, will remain. 
Nevertheless, everything I have said about the literary 
public and the high vernacular implies a defence of the 
paradigms. I believe, as practically everybody in our busi-
ness except perhaps Leslie Fiedler believes, that they per-
sist, that they are in fact inescapable. I distinguish here 
between what I call the paradigms-the radical patterns 
of fiction-and what are elsewhere called archetypes or 
myths. They may all be related in ways too deep for me; 
I should hope in fact that this is so, since harmony between 
dissident desires of the mind is what fictions provide; this 
is not quite the same thing as saying with Bacon that they 
submit the show of things to the desire of the mind, 
because one of our desires is to test our fictions by the 
elusive criterion of reality. Between the fictional para-
digms and reality there is a gulf, the gulf of absurdity; at 
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worst we may feel that this is a model of the human 
condition. That is what Camus and Sartre said. A plot 
satisfies a need for causality, a peripeteia our sense that 
ends are predictable absolutely but not contingently, and 
so on; but all this is human, and it is also human to remind 
oneself occasionally that the world at large appears not to 
be like that. The peripeteia is part of human sentiment. 
When a plot is related not to reality but to some stereotype 
we are altogether too conscious of the absurdity; this is 
why Jane Austen rejected contemporary fiction and de-
vised a new kind of novel, and why Henry James wrote 
"The Art of Fiction" and once again rethought the whole 
problem. Concords between fiction and reality are, in 
short, subject to decay. Literature inhabits time. Much of 
it seems to us absurd even when it is new; the rest of it, 
however humane, intelligent and complete its concords, is 
under a growing threat of absurdity. Is it then, like a 
scientific conjecture that experience or experiment refutes? 
What prevents us from discarding King Lear? 
We are back at the catechumen's question. If you want 
to know "how it is" why not read Comment c'est? Isn't 
Endgame closer to our point than a story about early 
British ingratitude? In answering we must concede that 
though it is true, as Yeats remarked, that responsibilities 
begin in dreams, it is also true that we know the difference 
between a dream and a work of art, and that when Freud 
defined this as a matter of adjustment to reality he was 
saying what we all knew already; so that the rebellious 
student, as I said, has a right to this question. And yet a 
sense of the persistent relevance of Lear is obviously a con-
dition of membership of the literary public. Note that 
Lear can be performed as a tragedy of the absurd; the 
argument is that in denying all absolutes Shakespeare turns 
tragedy into a farce of the sort that can be called grotesque 
or absurd, in a modern sense. Note also that Endgame 
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can be said to include Lear. Such is Kott's argument in 
his book on Shakespeare. Absurdity, he says, has replaced 
the absolute, but "the world of tragedy and the world of 
grotesque have a similar structure. Grotesque takes over 
the themes of tragedy and poses the same fundamental 
question." 
I am not on the whole an admirer of this critic, but it 
seems to me that his absurdist redemption of King Lear is 
merely a somewhat exaggerated version of what, as ac-
credited members of the literary public, we are all con-
stantly engaged in. So long as certain structures survive 
we can accommodate the past, and when they no longer 
survive it will be time to stop talking about art. Phy-
sicists speak of classical Newtonian mechanics as a "special 
case" of quantum mechanics and so prevent a discontinuity 
of theory-they do not have to say that the probability 
doctrine works only for small quantum numbers, holding 
instead that when the quantum numbers are large-as they 
are in anything we normally experience-the situation is 
exactly the same but behaves as if Newtonian theory was 
right. So dodecaphonic musicians can regard diatonic 
music as a special case; and our catechumen may be en-
couraged to think of Shakespeare as playing Newton to 
Beckett's Heisenberg; the validity of Lear is maintained 
over practically the whole area of human experience. Its 
conformity with a changed reality, as well as its power to 
satisfy those needs we satisfy by means of fictions, are 
accordingly vindicated. 
This is by no means a total answer to the charges 
brought by schismatics, but it does tell us what a large part 
of our critical office must be. It is to convince the postulant 
that if he learns the language and submits himself to the 
work he will discover its conformity with his own mind 
and th~ kinds of question he uniquely wants to ask. Even 
where it seems remote from his concerns, it has helped to 
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shape those concerns, and so needs to be understood. We 
know so much more; precisely, as Eliot said: and the great 
works are that which we know. "We" in that formulation 
are the literary public. 
Consequently I feel some irrelevance in arguments 
which stress the mythical basis as opposed to the heuristic 
function of great literature and the "scientific" as opposed 
to the more random "personalist" method. To make all 
literature rest scientifically on the great sunken founda-
tions of a quest myth, or to satisfy oneself by relating it to 
its moment, seem to me ways of emphasising its potential 
of irrelevance. To say that its structure is in one way or 
another analogous to the structure of our own human 
enquiries into our condition you have to be prepared to 
relate it not to prehistoric or unconscious archetypes, but 
to the set of our own minds and to the codes still necessary 
to participation in art. In the past apocalypse absorbed 
prophecy, and tragedy absorbed apocalypse, and now per-
haps tragedy has been absorbed by modes which allow for 
greater self-consciousness about fictions, and reduce the 
plight of the hero to absurdity; Sartre's existentialism does 
after all have a strongly tragic cast. It is the place of the 
older forms within our immediate concerns, their power 
to survive as formative for those concerns, that determines 
whether or no they do survive or can be revived. They 
live in change; if they cannot do so they are no longer 
susceptible to personal knowledge and they are relegated 
to the Latin schools. 
Continuity, then, and the conclusion is not unfamiliar, 
is indispensable; what remains as the language of our 
persona ficta, the literary public, is what it could not 
function without. But of course it is we who uphold this 
continuity, and we can best do it by testing the works 
which constitute the high vernacular against the scepticism 
of those whose sense of reality diverges from ours. This is 
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done in universities, and in substitutes for and extensions 
of them. We may sometimes have to say no, in whatever 
kind of thunder we can muster, to the claims of some 
works to be included in the canon; some we take to be 
there we may have to expel. There has to be this dialogue 
between tradition and schism, between our acceptance and 
the fresh scepticism of the young. There is learning and 
unlearning; there is a controlled change in knowledge, 
but there is also the degree of perpetuity an institution 
can have. But everything I have said is part of the tacit 
knowledge of a university one hundred years old; which 
is why I began by saying that it is as wise as it will ever 
be because it can live in change, the tree which bears one 
generation and its language after another, 
come fronda in ramo, che sen va e altra vene. 
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A JOURNALIST LOOKS AT 
THE HUMANITIES 
By BARRY BINGHAM 
I FEEL THAT I should start this statement with 
an apology. There is a good deal of presumption in my 
appearing here to talk about the humanities among such 
eminent specialists as the other speakers at this Conference. 
I come to you from the untidy field of journalism. The 
word "journalese" is not traditionally a term of flattery. 
At its best it is a synonym for hurried and superficial 
expression. At its most pejorative it is used to describe 
the cheap, the meretricious, and the vulgar. Many people 
in the academic world no doubt view the writing that is 
set before them in their daily newspaper in Milton's 
phrase: "The asinine feast of sow thistles and brambles." 
There are four reasons, however, why I want to discuss 
the humanities with you from the standpoint of a working 
journalist. Let me summarize them: 
1. I regard a good humanistic education as the best 
possible training for a newspaper career. Courses in the 
techniques of journalism can be helpful. The bedrock, 
however, is a sound training in the humanities. 
2. I believe the arts and humanities will make more 
news in America in the next decade than in all the previ-
ous course of our history. 
3. I consider the spread of humanistic education as the 
one hopeful escape for the American people from the 
besetting danger of an affluent society-the yawning empti-
ness that has been called "the abyss of leisure." 
4. I am convinced that the humanities, teaching as 
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Professor Kermode says "the lesson of continuity," can 
help to supply standards for a society that is sick from the 
want of them. 
To take my purely vocational point first, I always like 
to hire young men and women who have had a solid 
grounding in the liberal arts. Nothing so sharpens their 
power of observation and nothing so widens their gift of 
imagination. Newspaper work is far more demanding 
than it was a couple of generations ago. It used to be 
enough to hire a reporter who could rush out to cover a 
fire or an accident and come back with an accurate account 
of what happened. Those were the days of the old formula 
for a news story-who~ what, when, where, and why. Such 
basic accuracy is still a requirement of the craft. In our 
times, however, a general assignments reporter may be 
asked to go out on successive days to interview a celebrated 
Russian composer, a nuclear physicist, and an expert in 
remedial reading. Every course he ever took in college 
may be called to his rescue at some point in his pro-
fessional career. 
Newspapers are coming to rely increasingly on reporting 
by specialists. They now operate in the fields of education, 
science, medicine, public welfare and city planning, as 
well as the older specialties of music, art and the theatre. 
Such specialists must obviously have sound training in the 
fields they undertake to cover. It is their job to write in 
such a way as to satisfy the professionals, while conveying 
a clear meaning of the material to the layman. This is no 
easy task. These specialists with basic courses in the 
humanities are a different breed from the hard-boiled, 
gum-snapping stereotype of the newspaperman who flour-
ished in that classic of a past era called "The Front Page." 
Newspapers are turning increasingly to the best colleges 
to provide us with young recruits who can write good news 
material because they understand the basis of what they 
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are writing about. That is the only kind of story that can 
give satisfaction to a reader. Such well-educated young 
journalists can help us to get rid of the hoary cliches of 
newspaper style. They can bring us closer to that clean 
simplicity of writing which makes the essays of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, for all their elevation of thought, per-
fectly understandable to an eighth grade schoolboy. In 
many instances, let us hope, they may achieve Professor 
Kermode's "high vernacular." 
On my second point, I believe the newspapers of Amer-
ica must prepare to report something like a cultural explo-
sion in this country in the years just ahead. The New 
York Times has already advised us of the presence of a 
"culture industry." It notes that "consumer spending on 
the arts rose from 1953 to 1960 by about 130 percent, or 
considerably more than twice as fast as spending on all 
recreation, and better than six times as fast as the out-
lay for spectator sports." The Times analysis concludes 
with this comment: "We look for our society to become 
increasingly art-conscious at all levels. It would not sur-
prise us to observe a rna jor swing to conspicuous aes-
thetics." There is something a little disturbing in the way 
this thought is expressed. One is inclined to ask: If culture 
comes, can hucksterism be far behind? The resources of 
Madison Avenue are already devoted to the sale of certain 
items, such as book and record club memberships, on a 
basis of intellectual snobbery. There is nothing to regret, 
however, in the vast increase in the American sales of 
classical recordings, of good literature in paperback edi-
tions, and in original works of art. The newspapers must 
keep abreast of this national trend in their coverage of 
what is sometimes called "the culture beat." They must 
not only keep abreast but, to paraphrase Professor Ker-
mode, even help bully our people into genuine participa-
tion in the knowledge which is art, history, philosophy, 
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and literature. They must, as Professor Frye would say, 
help us to "qualify experience." 
And this leads directly to my third point. It concerns 
the desperate need of the American people to find some 
constructive use for their increasing hours of leisure. No 
society in history has provided so much "spare time" away 
from the machine and the kitchen stove for so massive a 
portion of its people. The ruling classes of imperial Rome 
and of eighteenth century England enjoyed a set of privi-
leges confined to a tiny minority of the population. We 
are now extending many of those privileges to the millions 
in America, and the process is inexorably spreading. It 
would be wicked to regard such an extension of leisure as 
anything but a glorious opportunity for a fuller, richer, 
more rewarding life. Yet there is a danger that leisure 
can become a burden in America instead of a blessing. 
To many it is a mere absence of occupation, a void that 
will begin to ache like a bad tooth if it is not quickly 
filled with some busy though meaningless activity. 
If there is one principle in our Declaration of Inde-
pendence which the American people have embraced with 
ardor, it is the pursuit of happiness. Sometimes, however, 
the chase takes on the feverish and desperate character of 
what is inelegantly described as a "rat race." Matthew 
Arnold used more polished words in speaking of the "sick 
hurry of modern life." There is danger, then, that we may 
escape from drudgery only to fall into idleness, disillusion-
ment, and frustration. Americans are not people who are 
happy for long when they are doing nothing. There is no 
lasting happiness, on the other hand, in· doing things that 
can only be recommended as a way to kill time. We need 
to remember that the word "leisure" derives from the 
Greek word meaning school. The prime use of leisure for 
adult human beings is through a happy discipline and 
training of the mind. 
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Here is where the humanities can play the role of 
liberator to the American spirit. They can train many 
Americans to practice the arts, sometimes professionally, 
often just for the personal pleasure they bring. They can 
teach many more millions of Americans to appreciate the 
arts, by which we mean experiencing vicariously what the 
artist experienced as he created or even something more 
than he experienced. Such genuine appreciaton enables 
one, as Professor Kermode says, to find out through a 
piece of literature or art "the unknown things about him-
self." In this way the arts will make men's lives genuinely 
happier. 
Here, I am glad to say, the Congress of the United States 
has recently taken a relatively modest but nevertheless 
historic step. The House and Senate have passed a measure 
called "The National Arts and Humanities Act of 1965," 
and the President has signed it. The total expenditure 
proposed is only 21 million dollars the first year, a small 
item in our national budget. The purpose of the act is 
revolutionary, however. Some of the evidence cited at the 
Congressional hearings was exciting in the sense that the 
early statements of America's founding principles were 
exciting. 
Let me read you a paragraph from the declaration made 
by a presidential Commission on the Humanities, a group 
of twenty outstanding humanists: "The humanities," they 
declared, "are the study of that which is most human. 
Throughout man's conscious past they have played an 
essential role in forming, preserving, and transforming the 
social, moral, and aesthetic values of every man in every 
age. One cannot speak of history or culture apart from 
the humanities. They not only record our lives; our lives 
are the very substance they are made of. Their subject is 
every man. We propose, therefore, a program for all our 
people, a program to meet a need no less serious than 
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that for our national defense. We speak, in truth, for 
what is being defended-our beliefs, our ideals, our high-
est achievements." 
Of course the Congress cannot pass a miracle as it passes 
a law and make America overnight a paradise of the 
humanities. The objective of this first Congressional act, 
however, is excellent. It is dedicated to this thesis: "That 
democracy demands wisdom and vision in its citizens and 
that it must therefore foster and support a form of educa-
tion designed to make men masters of their technology 
and not its unthinking servants." President Johnson has 
acknowledged the limits of governmental action in the 
field of the arts. "No government," he concedes, "can call 
artistic excellence into existence. It must flow from the 
quality of the society and the good fortune of the nation. 
Nor should any government seek to restrain the freedom 
of the artist to pursue his calling in his own way. Freedom 
is an essential condition for the artist .... But government 
can seek to create conditions under which the arts can 
flourish; through recognition of achievements, through 
helping those who seek to enlarge creative understanding, 
through increasing the access of our people to the works 
of our artists, and through recognizing the arts as part of 
the pursuit of American greatness." 
This leads me to my final point on America's need for 
a flowering of the humanities. We are confronted today 
with a curious irony of social history. On the one hand 
we have in America a society more broadly privileged, 
more liberated from monotonous toil, than any that this 
planet has known. On the other hand we have a society 
that seems haunted by unhappiness. Many young Ameri-
cans, offered an amazing gamut of opportunities, flee from 
so baffling a choice to the oblivion of drugs or the refuge 
of the psychiatrist's couch. The old symbols of authority 
have been banished, as the statues of former rulers have 
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been demolished in what were once colonial cities of Asia 
and Africa. Parents seldom exert the discipline over their 
children which was once the standard of family life. Many 
schools are so intent on seeing that young people enjoy 
themselves in the classroom that they overlook the endur-
ing joy that comes from learning. 
The churches of America show an all-time record of 
membership. Attendance, too, is high among well-dressed, 
well-fed and well-intentioned people. The tragedy is that 
so many Americans, and especially so many young Ameri-
cans, find it impossible to accept the standards offered by 
organized religion. They cannot grasp the idea of a God 
"in whose service is perfect freedom." The ancient stand-
ards are still there, expressed with unparalleled nobility 
in the words of the Bible and in the rituals of all the varied 
churches. Other generations have found a source of 
strength in these precepts. Many young Americans have 
become completely deaf to them in the ceaseless din of 
modern life. 
In the ancient human wisdom of religion there are 
answers to all the questions that plague young people 
everywhere. Here is the answer to their search for 
identity, for a pattern of meaning in life, for a security 
that extends beyond the possession of a "steady date" or a 
job or a ranch-house with a two-car garage. But many 
young people are embarrassed by the great truths of 
religion, and feel like hypocrites in a church to whose 
doctrines they cannot bring themselves to subscribe. Since 
they think of religion, to use Professor Frye's words, as "a 
dark preserve of mystery on which the sun of science has 
not risen," they reject its doctrines and hard obligations. 
It has been said that Americans are people who want to 
get to the promised land without passing through the 
wilderness. We are in a spiritual wilderness now, but we 
still have the ambition to achieve the high ground. 
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The trouble is that we have impatiently dismissed all 
the old guides and torn up the maps, because we wanted 
to be free of all restraining authority. We are free, all 
right-free to get lost and to wander in circles while the 
darkness begins to fall. A demand for freedom is running 
like a great tide around the world, and young Americans 
are caught in its powerful surge. In Indonesia they call 
it "merdekka," and crowds scream for it in the streets. In 
the old French colonies the cry has been for liberte. The 
words vary, but the fever and intoxication are everywhere 
the same. In some places the demand has been for political 
freedom, long denied and now passionately desired. Else-
where the battle is for economic independence. Some 
Americans have been fighting, and some few of them 
dying, for the freedom to vote and to go to the same schools 
and hospitals with other Americans whose skin is a differ-
ent color. That cause has aroused the idealism of many 
young, white Americans, to their eternal credit. 
Some other young Americans, however, have concen-
trated on a drive for absolute individual freedom, freedom 
from all discipline and responsibility. Such unlimited 
liberty is not compatible with life in a civilized society. 
It is here that the humanities have something invaluable 
to offer to American life. The efforts of religion must 
and will of course continue unabated. But the humanities 
can to some extent share a job that needs all the help 
that can be mustered. The humanities, like religion, are 
not ashamed to erect standards of human behavior. They 
are not afraid to invoke the higher instincts of the human 
spirit. Plato sounded the call long ago, in the sunlight of 
Greece's glorious morning: "By education I mean the 
training in excellence from youth upwards which makes 
a man passionately desire to be a perfect citizen, and 
teaches him how to rule, and to obey, with justice." 
Few people today would dare to speak in such exalted 
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terms-"training in excellence," "a perfect citizen," the 
ability either to rule or to obey "with justice." The aim 
of a humanistic education is not always proclaimed so 
unabashedly, but the goal has remained fundamentally 
the same through the ages. To Francis Bacon it was 
clear that "men should enter upon learning in order to 
give a true account of their gifts of reason, to the benefit 
and use of men." Even in the wasteland of the twentieth 
century, T. S. Eliot was able to make the same affirmation. 
"The natural end of man," he declared, "is virtue and 
well-being in the community." 
The very word virtue has an archaic ring in the ears of 
young Americans. Yet in the sense that the great poets, 
philosophers and humanists have employed that word, I 
submit that it is the quality young Americans are blindly 
seeking at this moment. They blush at outward expres-
sions of idealism, yet many of them eagerly embrace 
practical forms of idealism in modern life. I am thinking 
of the Peace Corps, of service in city slums and in lonely 
Appalachian valleys, or on the ragged battlefronts of the 
civil rights movement. The quality of idealism is still 
burning bright in the secret consciousness of millions of 
young Americans, though they are at pains to hide it 
behind a facade of "cool" behavior. They are longing to 
make a commitment to something far bigger than them-
selves, if they can only find it. They are in search of 
standards they have renounced without ever knowing their 
meaning. If they search too long without finding an object 
on which to focus their inner sense of dedication, they will 
turn into the cynical, bitter, frustrated adults of tomorrow. 
I ·have urged a vigorous application of the humanities to 
American life for four reasons, but the last is the most 
vital. This is a work of liberation. The humanities have 
been committed to such a cause since the times of antiq-
uity. They can yet, as Professor Beardsley says in his 
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lecture, "enlarge and sensitize our ability to understand 
each other," without which enlargement and sensitization 
there can be no liberation, no freedom, of the human 
spirit. The old rallying cries are still vibrant, the banners 
still bright, the trumpets tuned to the call. It has always 
been the goal of the humanities to set men free. Now 
they must show the courage to help lead out of bondage 
an American generation that sold its inheritance for an 
illusion of freedom, but has found itself enslaved anew 
by its own fears and frustration. 
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